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Insurance companies, by their nature, bear risks. These risks partly
depend on insurers’ ability to anticipate the frequency and magnitude of
the losses that they promise to cover. Because insurers manage portfo-
lios of assets to pay these obligations, they also bear risks similar to
those of other financial intermediaries, risks that depend on changes in
the value of their assets compared to that of their contractual liabilities.
Because the capacity of insurance companies to absorb losses is
limited, their customers also bear some risk. In order to limit this risk, a
variety of public agencies examine and regulate insurers. Often con-
tracts also are covered by guaranty funds, which essentially allow the
customers of failing insurance companies to transfer a portion of their
unsatisfied claims to the other participating insurers. But, this safety
network can fail if too many insurance companies have assumed similar
risks.
Recently, some highly publicized failures of insurers, following the
difficulties of the thrift and banking industries, have drawn attention to
the financial condition of the insurance industries.1 Because the insur-
ance business differs substantially from that of depository institutions,
most of the specific problems of these industries are not comparable.
In one general respect, however, the same challenge confronts
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insurers, thrift institutions, banks, and most other intermediaries. The
financial strategies of intermediaries in the United States presumed a
stability of interest rates that began to break down in the late 1960s.
These intermediaries assumed a bet that yields and differences among
yields would not change greatly for prolonged intervals of time. Con-
sequently, the rising interest rates of the past two decades are taking
their toll. From the point of view of many financial institutions, a
principal "failed promise" during these years has been the bout of
persistent inflation responsible for increasing rates of interest.
In order to cope, many financial institutions assumed new bets by
reaching for riskier assets offering higher yields or by operating with less
capital per dollar of assets. To varying degrees, many insurance com-
panies have adopted these strategies. Life insurance companies holding
one-sixth of their industry’s assets have relatively low capitalization,
and companies holding as much as three-quarters of industry assets
have substantial investments in assets that currently are considered
risky. Property-liability companies representing approximately one-fifth
of that industry’s assets have comparatively little capital by historical
standards, and companies representing three-fifths of industry assets
would have low capital if interest rates were to rise substantially in the
near future.
Of all the remedies inspired by the recent investigations of the
insurance industries, none appears to be more important than raising
more capital. With the increasing volatility of interest rates and the
increasing competition among financial intermediaries during the last
three decades, insurers need to carry more capital per dollar of assets if
insurance contracts are to be as secure as they were supposed to be prior
to the late 1960s. Because guaranty funds inherently are no stronger
than the capital of participating insurers, these funds, alone, cannot
compensate for insurers’ lack of capital unless these funds commit the
government to indemnifying customers of insurance companies.
Regulatory reforms could do much to limit the risks borne by
insurers and those holding insurance contracts, but the potential efficacy
of these reforms is limited. As financial intermediaries, insurers invest in
some assets whose risks and returns are difficult for "outsiders" to
assess. Furthermore, much of the risk borne by an insurance company
arises from the blends of both assets and liabilities that constitute the
company’s balance sheet. Successful regulation could foster an "ade-
quate" diversification of assets or the "proper" matching of assets and
liabilities; yet, after a point, assessing "adequacy" and "propriety"
requires the oversight and skills of a resident shadow management.
The analysis in this paper proceeds from the general to the specific.
The first section discusses the risks inherent in financial intermediation.
The second section describes the roles of life and property-liability
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in their aggregate balance sheets during the last three decades. The third
section, using reports submitted to the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners for 1989, examines the distribution of assets,
capital, and liabilities among life insurance companies and among
property-liability insurance companies. The fourth section, using public
information, discusses the risks entailed by the asset concentrations of
insurance companies and the similarities between the recent experiences
of insurers and banking institutions. This paper concludes that many
insurers must increase their capital to cope safely with the consequences
of a significant slump in the value of commercial real estate, a substantial
decline in corporate profits, or a significant rise in credit market yields.
Financial Intermediation and Risk
Economic development and capital formation depend on the effi-
cient transfer of resources from those who would save to those who
would invest. In the United States, more than three-quarters of the
funds transferred to investors in the form of credit market instruments
or loans flow through financial intermediaries. On one,hand, insurance
companies, depository institutions, pension funds, and other interme-
diaries issue financial claims with features that appeal to savers; on the
other hand, these intermediaries accept financial obligations from bor-
rowers on terms that appeal to borrowers. Without this intermediation,
each financial contract must accommodate at once the frequently dis-
parate motives of savers and investors. Intermediaries also serve savers
and investors by evaluating investors’ prospects, monitoring their
performance, and providing both savers and investors a dependable
access to funds on terms commensurate with their risks and returns.2
By design, intermediaries, which transform primary securities is-
sued by investors into assets valued by savers, manage an unmatched
book. To compensate for this risk, these intermediaries expect to receive
a sufficiently large margin between the effective yields they offer savers
and the effective yields they earn on their assets. Savers may be willing
to earn a yield below that prevailing in financial markets or to sacrifice
liquidity in order to receive services not offered by primary securities or
by mutual funds. Investors who are not recognized in public credit
markets may be willing to pay greater yields or to accept terms more
stringent than those prevailing in financial markets in order to cultivate
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a reliable source of funds. The more savers value competitive yields and
the more investors can avail themselves of competitive yields, the more
intermediaries’ expected profit and capacity for bearing risk shrink.
The capacity of intermediaries to bear risk also depends on their
leverage. With more equity capital and surplus per dollar of assets,
intermediaries can honor their contracts despite deeper or more pro-
longed financial setbacks. In principle, more capital could increase the
odds of survival when expected profit margins are low compared to the
volatility of profits. Yet, with lower profit margins, intermediaries
ordinarily require greater leverage to maintain a competitive return on
capital. From the viewpoint of their customers, increasing leverage
under these circumstances would compromise safety and soundness.
Extraordinary losses or competitive pressures encourage insurance
companies, like other intermediaries, to acquire assets promising greater
yields and risks or to increase the volume of their underwriting relative
to their surplus. These strategies increase both the odds that the
contracts of weak insurers will not be honored in full and the odds that
failing insurers will not recover. These risky strategies often are the most
appealing for imperiled intermediaries, because the price of obtaining
new capital can appear to be too expensive for the existing owners.
Regulation and Guaranty Funds
Because the interests of those who own and manage financial
institutions do not necessarily coincide with the interests of their
customers, intermediaries typically are regulated by public agencies. But
this reliance on oversight by outsiders also can pose risks. Assessing the
specific values of insurers’ assets and liabilities or their inherent risks
and returns is difficult for both customers and regulators.3
Many insurance contracts are covered to some degree by guaranty
funds in most states. Like the guaranty funds for depository institu-
tions, the strength of these funds depends on the ability of their
members to pay the necessary assessments. And, like the guaranty
funds for depository institutions, the failure of these funds may uncover
an implicit "put" written on state or federal governments. In cases when
the federal government provides disaster relief or catastrophic insurance
coverage, insurers, their customers, and their guaranty funds possess
an explicit put option. Sometimes this put is less obvious: insurers may
be able to claim tax deductions or tax credit for assessments paid to
guaranty funds. Because of the ambivalent status of guaranty funds,
governments that bear the potential burden of this put option attempt to
3 See Randall (1989). Assessing these risks also may be difficult for insiders; see
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design regulations that limit the inevitable failure of insurers to isolated,
manageable cases.
This put option on the government also has deeper consequences
for regulation and economic policy. Even if intermediaries hold well-
diversified portfolios of assets, their financial condition is contingent on
the stability of the prices of capital assets. For example, if economic
policy does not ratify the expectations of investors who install an
"excessive" number of factories or develop an "excessive" amount of
real estate, then the subsequent collapse in the prices of capital assets
could entail extraordinary losses among financial intermediaries. Ac-
cordingly, the success of "deposit insurance" ultimately depends on the
ability of economic policy and financial regulation to avoid binges and
purges, to foster a flow of investments generally consistent with the
potential growth of the economy.
Neither regulation nor guaranty funds necessarily promote safety
and soundness. At times, regulations limit either the assets intermedi-
aries hold or the variety of liabilities they issue in a fashion that
diminishes their efficiency, perhaps reducing their expected returns
more than the potential variability of their returns.4 At other times,
intermediaries reporting substantial current returns (by undertaking a
risky investment strategy) may appeal strongly to customers and may
not be examined closely by regulators; these institutions also may be
allowed to carry less capital or surplus than their competitors,s To the
degree customers believe that regulated intermediaries bear an "under-
writers’ laboratory seal of approval," and to the degree that intermedi-
aries are covered by explicit guarantees or by an implicit put option onto
the government, financial institutions can become less sound, unless
regulators can assess accurately their financial strategies.
Insurance Companies as Financial Intermediaries
Insurance companies manage approximately 16 percent of all the
financial assets held by intermediaries in the United States (Table 1). The
share of assets under their control is nearly as great as the share of assets
held by the thrift institutions; only the share of commercial banks is
significantly higher.
Since the 1950s, property-liability insurers’ share of all financial
assets held by intermediaries has remained constant, while the share
4 Regulations designed to make intermediaries more secure by limiting the liabilities
they may issue and the assets they may hold might instead make both the economy and
intermediaries less stable; see Kopcke and Rosengren (1989).
s See, for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury (1991).Table 1
Assets of Financial Intermediaries
Percent of Total
1952- 1956- 1961- 1966- 1971- 1976- 1981- 1986-
Financial Intermediary                     1900 1912 1922 1929 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Life Insurance Companies 10.1 13.0 12.2 14.4 21.1 20.2 18.0 16.0 13.4 12.1 11.4 11.6
Property-Liability Insurance Companies 2.9 3.2 4.1 6.2 4.4 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.1 4.5
Commercial Banks 64.1 65.5 64.7 52.7 47.2 40.8 37.1 37.5 39.2 37.9 34.8 30.9
Thrift Institutions 19.1 15.2 13.6 14.8 15.4 18.4 20.9 20.5 21.0 22.3 20.3 17.9
Pension Funds * * .1 .4 5.6 8.4 10.8 12.4 13.5 15.3 17.1 17.6
Private n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.4 5.4 7.2 8.3 8.9 10.4 11.6 11.3
State & Local Government n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.2 3.0 3.6 4.1 4.6 - 4.8 5.5 6.3
Investment Trusts * * .2 2.6 1.4 2.3 3.3 4.0 3.4 1.8 2.1 6.6
Mutual Funds n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 2.3 3.3 3.9 2.8 1.6 2.0 5.2
Finance Companies * * * 2.2 3.7 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1
Securities Brokers and Dealers 3.8 3.1 5.1 6.7 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.9
Money Market Mutual Funds n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 0 0 0 * .7 3.8 3.8
¯ = less than 0.05%
n.a. = not applicable
Source: All data 1900 to 1929 from Goldsmith (1955) and Goldsmith (1958).
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Table 2
Insurance Companies’ Holdings of Selected Financial Assets
Percent of Total Value Outstanding of Each Security
1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985-
Asset 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989
Tax-Exempt Bonds
Life Companies 4.8 2.9 2.0 2.2 2,0 1.3
Property-Liability Cos. 11.9 11.7 13.9 19.4 21,0 18.0
Corporate Bonds
Life Companies 51.4 45,1 35,8 34.4 34.1 32.0
Property-Liability Cos. 1,8 2.8 3.4 4.4 4.0 4.4
Corporate Equities
Life Companies 1.2 1,2 1.6 2.2 2.0 1,5
Property-Liability Cos, 2.3 1.9 2.4 2,5 2,4 1.4
Commercial Mortgages
Life Companies 30,5 31.2 29.4 29.6 30.4 26.8
Property-Liability Cos. .3 .3 .2 .2 .6 ,8
Multifamily Mortgages
Life Companies 19,0 25.4 23.0 17.5 12,8 8.9
Home Mortgages
Life Companies 16.6 12.6 7.0 2.8 1.6 ,8
Source: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds; AM. Best Company, Best’s
Aggregates and Averages--Life/Health, various years; and A.M. Best Company, Best’s Aggregates and
Averages--Property/Casualty, various years.
managed by life companies has fallen by almost one-half. During the
early 1950s, life companies alone managed about 21 percent of interme-
diaries’ assets. Currently, their share is under 12 percent. About
two-thirds of this decline occurred in the late 1960s and in the 1970s;
since then, the share of life insurers has changed little.
The presence of insurance companies traditionally has been greatest
in the bond and mortgage markets (Table 2). During the 1960s life
insurers held about one-half of the outstanding corporate bonds. Al-
though this share has fallen with the advent of mutual funds and the
growth of pension plans, life companies still hold approximately one-
third of corporate bonds. During the past thirty years, life insurers
consistently have held approximately 30 percent of commercial mort-
gages, while their shares of residential mortgages have declined because
of the growth of the thrift industry. Property-liability insurers hold
approximately one-fifth of the outstanding municipal bonds.
Both life and property-liability insurers invest more than one-half of
their assets in longer-term securities bearing fixed yields (Table 3).
Bonds account for almost 50 percent of life insurers’ assets, and
mortgage loans, four-fifths of which were commercial mortgages in
1989, account for another 20 percent. Together, real estate holdings and
corporate equities, mostly the common stock of affiliates, represent less26 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
Table 3
Balance Sheet of Life and Property-Liability Companies
Percent of Total Assets
1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985-













































* = less than 0.05%.
n,a. = not available.
47.4 42.6 40,2 43.4 40.7 46.5
9.2 6,4 4.8 6.2 8.6 12.9
n.a. n.a, n.a, n.a. 5,0 8,4
n,a. n.a. n,a. n,a, 1.9 3,1
38.2 36.2 35.5 37.2 32.1 33.7
n.a. n.a, n.a, n.a. 9,2 7,8
n.a. n.a. n.a. n,a. 21.7 25.0
4.8 5.6 6,5 6.4 6.0 4.9
n.a, n,a, n.a, n.a. 2.1 .9
n.a. n.a. n.a. n,a. 3,9 4,0
n.a. n.a. n.a. n,a. 1.6 1.2
n.a. n,a. n.a, n.a, 1.7 2.4
35,5 37.5 33,3 28.2 23.9 19.8
9.2 11.3 13,3 15.4 15.6 15.2
3.1 2,9 3,0 2.9 2.5 2.4
4.6 5.8 7.9 8.0 8.5 5.3
n,a. 1.2 3.5 5,1 9.0 10.4
4.5 4.8 5,5 6.0 9.4 10.7
81,4 80.2 81,0 81.6 79.0 82.4
10.2 11,0 11,0 11.4 12.9 9.7
8.4 8,8 7.8 6.9 8.2 8.0
50.3 50.0 51.4 62.2 58,0 57,8
16.9 12.2 7.1 9.8 10.7 15,3
16,0 14,0 15,2 13.8 11.2 9.2
11.5 14.3 17.2 24.5 25,7 21.0
5.2 8.8 11.1 13.1 9.7 11,6
32.0 31.7 28.2 17,2 14.0 9.4
2.6 2.7 3.4 3,2 3.9 2,1
* * ,1 .3 .6 .6
.4 .4 .3 .3 ,7 1.1
1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 .8 .2
13.1 13.6 15.0 15.4 22.0 28.7
25,9 30.7 36.5 44,4 46.0 43.0
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.6 7,2
25.9 25.4 23.9 21.4 17,5 16.9
1.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4
5.3 5.8 6.7 7.7 6,8 6,3
41.8 36,7 31,6 25.2 25.7 24.9
For 1960 to 1976, data for the property and casualty companies are on a nonconsolidated basis.
Source: For life insurance companies from 1960 to 1979, American Council of Life Insurance, Life Insurance
Fact Book, various years. For life insurance companies from 1980 to 1989, A.M. Best Company, Best’s
Aggregates andAverages--Life/Health, various years. For property and casualty insurance companies, A.M.
Best Company, Best’s Aggregates and Averages--Property/Casualty, various years.INSURANCE COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 27
than 8 percent of life insurance assets. Property-liability or casualty
insurers invest almost 60 percent of their assets in bonds and another 10
percent in equities, while their holdings of mortgage loans and real
estate are minimal. The average maturity of bonds in both life and
property-liability insurers’ portfolios exceeds 10 years, and the average
maturity of mortgages is approximately one-half that of bonds.
The Correspondence between Assets and Liabilities
The invested assets of insurance companies are financed principally
by the premiums they have collected for writing their contracts and by
capital or surplus, which represents the contribution of those who own
the companies. Most of the assets of insurance companies are held in
reserves to pay the claims of those holding their contracts.
Although life insurers anticipate paying most of their claims only
after their contracts have been in force for many years, those who own
these contracts often possess the option to borrow against their reserves
(frequently at favorable rates of interest) or to cancel their contracts for
cash. Recently, some life insurers have aggressively sold guaranteed
investment contracts (GICs) in addition to their more traditional insur-
ance and annuity products. Because GICs are comparatively short-term
liabilities, which appeal to buyers mainly by offering a competitive rate
of interest, insurers relying on these contracts reduce the average
"maturity" of their liabilities.
The reserves of property-liability companies are held mainly
against homeowner, automobile, and commercial policies. Casualty
insurers ordinarily expect to pay most of their claims within a few years
of writing their contracts. Yet, when casualty companies can replace
expiring contracts with new contracts and cover their claims by their
flow of premium receipts, they may manage a relatively stable portfolio
of assets over many years.
If yields on securities are relatively stable, insurers can comfortably
regard their liabilities as being of long duration and invest them in long-
term assets. Indeed, when the yields on longer-term securities exceed
those on shorter-term securities, insurers can price their contracts most
attractively by investing their assets in longer-term securities.
Should all yields rise significantly and remain high, however,
established insurers cannot continue to offer competitive terms on
existing contracts without diminishing their return on surplus. Proper-
ty-liability insurers, especially, may depend on the flow of premiums to
pay claims should the values of their assets fall at the same time that the
magnitude of their losses unexpectedly rises. Under these circum-
stances, insurers could find themselves relying on comparatively short-
term liabilities to finance long-term assets.
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Interest Rate on Corporate Bonds
1980
with the 1960s encouraged insurance companies to invest their reserves
in long-term assets, their experience during the subsequent two decades
undermined their confidence in this strategy. Between 1860 and 1960,
interest rates on bonds were relatively stable (Figure 1). During the past
three decades, however, a doubling of yields brought many changes to
the insurance industries.
The Performance of the Life Insurance Industry
Since the 1950s, the capitalization of life insurance companies as a
whole has varied little, remaining near 8 percent of the value of their
assets as reported on their books. But at times during the 1970s and
1980s, the yields on their bonds and mortgages were sufficiently below
yields prevailing in credit markets that their capitalization would have
been below zero had their assets alone been marked to market.
Although policy lapse rates and loans to policyholders increased
during this interval, the vast majority of policyholders left their funds on
deposit with life insurers through 1985, when the returns on insurers’
assets once again compared favorably with the yields prevailing in credit
markets. Nonetheless, life insurance companies’ share of the flow of
funds into intermediaries fell significantly beginning in the late 1960s.
Established insurers coped by promoting new liabilities or new linesINSURANCE COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 29
of business, while new companies, unburdened by investments bearing
low yields, expanded their share of the life insurance, annuity, and
pension businesses. Life insurers also acquired new assets promising
greater or more flexible returns, often accompanied by more risk. As a
result of this experience of the past two decades, life insurers increas-
ingly are promoting their liabilities as investment contracts, and those
purchasing these liabilities increasingly value them mainly as financial
investments. These innovations may diminish life insurers’ ability to
bear risk in the future.
The Performance of the Property-Liability Insurance Industry
During the past three decades, the capitalization of property-
liability or casualty insurance companies fell more than two-fifths. In the
early 1960s, the capital and surplus of these insurers averaged more than
40 percent of assets. After earning a low rate of return on surplus in both
the mid 1960s and the mid 1970s, their capital and surplus fell below
one-fourth of assets.
Though the average capitalization of property-liability companies
as reported on their books has not changed greatly since the 1970s, at
times during the 1980s their capital would not have exceeded one-sixth
of assets, had their assets alone been marked to market. Customers of
property-liability insurers cannot cash in their policies, so marking only
the assets of these insurers to market understates their capital and
surplus. Nevertheless, during the 1980s persistent underwriting losses
substantially depressed the return on surplus for casualty insurers as a
whole. Since 1980, for example, the average return on surplus for
casualty insurers has been less than that of banks (10 percent versus 13
percent), even though the return on surplus for casualty insurers has
been more volatile. This performance may be attributed partly to
established insurers’ pricing existing and new contracts attractively in
order to maintain their flow of premium receipts.
Financial Characteristics of Insurance Companies in
1989
Within the life and property-liability insurance industries, the
financial characteristics of the individual companies can differ consider-
ably from those for their industry. Though the aggregate statistics for life
insurers show that the industry as a whole has not assumed great risks,
companies holding one-sixth of the industry’s assets have relatively low
capitalization, and companies holding as much as three-quarters of
assets have substantial investments in risky assets. Property-liability
companies holding one-fifth of that industry’s assets have relatively
little capital by historical standards. If interest rates were to rise3O Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
substantially in the near future, the capitalization of property-liability
companies holding more than three-fifths of the industry’s assets would
be less than one-half of recent industry averages.
In retrospect, many insurance companies carried too little capital in
the 1970s to cover adequately the risks inherent in their balance sheets.
The capitalization of these insurers is now less than that of the 1970s,
while their risks have not diminished. By this standard, rather than any
minimum acceptable ratio of capital to assets, the capital of many life
and casualty insurers appears to be too low given the risks they are
bearing.
Life Insurance Companies
Table 4 describes the distribution of assets in 1989 for the 62 largest
life insurance groups, representing about 80 percent of the industry’s
assets. One-sixth of the sample’s assets were held by companies with
capital less than 5 percent of assets (column 1). Approximately three-
quarters of the sample’s assets are held by companies for which capital
and surplus is no more than 6 percent of assets.
The table subdivides this sample further, according to each com-
pany’s investments in real estate, equity, low-grade bonds, and mort-
gages. For example, companies with capital to asset ratios below 5
percent hold 16.2 percent of the sample’s assets. The entries in the first
row of columns 2, 3, and 4 (which sum to 16.2 percent) partition this
share according to investments in risky assets: 13.6 percent of assets are
held by companies for which capitalization is less than 5 percent and for
which investments in real estate, equity, tow-grade bonds, and mort-
gages are greater than three times capital and surplus. Similarly, the
entries in the first row of columns 5, 6, and 7, columns 8, 9, and 10, or
columns 11, 12, and 13 (each group of three columns summing to 16.2
percent) partition the share of assets held by the companies with low
capitalization according to their investments in specific assets: 10.4
percent of assets are held by companies for which capitalization is less
than 5 percent and for which investments in real estate and equity are
tess than one-half of capital and surplus.
Most of the assets of life insurers are held by companies for which
capital and surplus is between 5 and 6 percent of assets (Table 4, row 2).
Although these companies have assets invested in real estate, equities,
and low-grade bonds, these investments generally are not as great as
their investments in mortgages, four-fifths of which are commercial
loans. Whereas together these companies hold 58.5 percent of the
industry’s assets, 43.0 percent of assets are held by insurers for which
mortgages are at least three times capital and surplus (row 2, last
column); only 6.7 percent of assets are held by insurers for which
holdings of low-grade bonds exceed capital and surplus (column 10);Table 4
Allocation of Assets among Life Insurance Companies, 1989
Percent of Total Assets
Risk Assets
Bonds below
Real Estate and Investment
Total Total Risk Assets Equity Grade Mortgages Life Insurance Companies,
Grouped by Capital (percent of capital (percent of capital (percent of capital (percent of capital
and Surplus as a and surplus) and surplus) and surplus) and surplus)
Percentage of Assets <100 100-300 >300 <50 50-100 >100 <50 50-100 >100 <100 100-300 >300
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11 ) (12) (13)
(1) <5 16.2 .5 2.1 13.6 10.4 t.6 4.2 6.5 6.5 3.3 2.0 1.4 12.8
(2) 5-6 58.5 .4 2.1 55.9 5.9 26.3 26.2 19.0 32.8 6.7 1.8 13.7 43.0
(3) 7-10 17.2 1.4 3.1 11.9 7.7 5.9 2.7 13.7 1.2 2.4 5.3 11.9 0
(4) >10 8.1 1.9 7.1 0 3.5 5.5 0 8.1 0 0 4.5 3.7 0
Total 100 4.3 14.4 81.4 27.6 39.3 33.2 47.3 40.5 12.4 13.5 30.6 55.8
Note: Risk assets include: real estate, common equity, bonds below investment grade and mortgages.
The real estate, equity, low-grade bonds, and mortgages shown are assets explicitly reported in general accounts and schedule D. No "miscellaneous assets" are
included in risk assets.
Short-term assets include: cash, bonds with a maturity of less than one year and short-term investments.
Separate accounts are not included in either total assets or total liabilities.
Data are for the 62 largest life insurance groups, representing about 80 percent of industry assets.
Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Database of Annual Statements.32 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
and 26.2 percent of assets are held by insurers for which real estate and
equity exceed capital and surplus (column 7).
Whereas the value of high-grade bonds held by life insurers varies
mainly with basic rates of interest, the value of real estate, equities,
low-grade bonds, and commercial mortgages depends largely on busi-
ness risks. If the maturity of insurers’ contracts matched that of their
assets, then changes in the market values of insurers’ assets due to
changes in rates of interest would not alter their capitalization very
greatly. But if the value of insurers’ assets were to fall for reasons other
than rising interest rates alone, then the capitalization of insurers would
decline.
Four-fifths of the assets of the sample of life insurers are held by
companies placing more than three times their capital in investments
that are currently considered risky: real estate, equities, low-grade
bonds, and mortgages (Table 4, column 4). Among these companies,
risky assets are more than six times capital and surplus. Should the
value of these assets fall by one-tenth, for instance, the capital of these
companies would fall more than 60 percent. In this case, more than
two-thirds of the sample’s assets would be held by companies for which
capital would be less than 4 percent of assets.
Life insurers also assume risk by financing their assets with short-
term guaranteed investment contracts (GICs). Even if a company were
to invest only in high-grade bonds, by relying on GICs for financing, it
risks losing capital should interest rates rise. Should the company invest
in riskier assets, those holding its GICs might not renew their contracts
should the value of these assets be questioned. While GICs are the most
visible source of short-term financing for life insurers, their permanent
life and annuity contracts also grant their customers options to with-
draw funds from the company should these contracts become suffi-
ciently unattractive.
As much as three-tenths of the assets of life insurers were held by
companies for which outstanding GICs were at least three times their
capital in 1989 (Table 5, column 5). If these funds were invested in
short-term, high-grade securities, this reliance on GICs would not be an
issue. Yet, as much as one-third of the assets of the industry was held by
insurers whose GICs were twice as great as their short-term assets
(Table 6, row 4, columns 4, 7, 10). Of these companies, insurers
representing two-tenths of the industry’s assets not only issued GICs
exceeding three times their capital and surplus, but also invested three
times their capital in real estate, equities, low-grade bonds, and mort-
gages (row 3, last column).6
6 Commercial mortgages, constituting four-fifths of total mortgages, represent most of
these risky investments. Some analysts contend that the funds raised by selling GICs wereINSURANCE COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 33
Table 5
Allocation of Assets among Life Insurance Companies Relying on Guaranteed
Investment Contracts (GICs), 1989
Percent of Total Assets
Life Insurance Companies,
Grouped by Capital and
Surplus as a Percentage
of Assets
Total GlCs Relative to Capital and Surplus
>50 50-100 100-300 >300
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) <5 16,2 6.1 1.0 1.8 7.3
(2) 5-6 58.5 30.0 .4 7,4 20.6
(3) 7-10 17.2 5.9 1,8 8.4 1,1
(4) >10 8,1 5,6 .8 .5 1,1
Total 100 47.6 4.0 18,1 30.1
Note and Source: See Table 4.
Property-Liability Insurance Companies
Table 7 describes the distribution of assets, according to capitaliza-
tion and return on surplus, for the 60 largest property-liability insurance
groups, representing about 90 percent of the industry’s assets in 1989.
Only about 48 percent of the industry’s assets in 1989 were held by
companies for which capital and surplus exceeded 20 percent of assets
(column 4, rows 4 to 7). Only one-half of these, in turn, reported a
return on surplus exceeding 9 percent. One-sixth of the industry’s assets
was represented by companies for which surplus was less than 20
percent of assets while, at the same time, returns on surplus were less
than 9 percent (column 1, rows 1 to 3).
In comparison with the standards that prevailed before the late
1970s, much of the property-liability insurance business is undercapi-
talized. Those insurers with capital amounting to less than 20 percent of
assets may be vulnerable either to unexpectedly large underwriting
losses or to a substantial increase in interest rates.
For example, if bond yields were to rise 3 percentage points and
dividend-price ratios on equity were to rise 1 percentage point, the
average ratio of capital to assets for property-liability insurers could fall
from almost 25 percent to approximately 12 percent. Under these
circumstances, about one-third of the industry’s assets would be held by
invested in commercial mortgages. Although the maturities of the GICs and these
mortgages are similar, the value of commercial mortgages is questionable, because of high
vacancy rates and low rents. See Shulman (1990) and Borman (1991).Table 6
Allocation of Assets among Life Insurance Companies that Issue Guaranteed Investment Contracts (GICs) and Hold Risk
Assets, 1989
Percent of Total Assets
Life Insurance Companies,
Grouped by Risk Assets
as a Percentage of Capital
and Surplus
Total GICs Relative to Capital & Surplus
50-100 100-300 >300
GICs Relative to Short-Term GICs Relative to Short-Term GICs Relative to Short-Term
Assets Assets Assets





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1.4 .4 0 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 0
2.9 0 0 .8 0 0 .9 0 0 1.1
48.0 0 2.8 0 0 3.4 11.0 0 9.8 21.1
52.4 .4 2.8 .8 0 3.4 12.9 0 9.8 22.2
Note and Source: See Table 4.INSURANCE COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 35
Table 7
Distribution of Assets Among Property-Liability Insurance Companies, 1989
Percent of Total Assets
Casualty Insurance Companies,
Grouped by Capital and














(1) 1-10 0 11.0 0
(2) 11-15 7.3 2.3 1.3
(3) 16-20 10.3 12.4 7.0
(4) 21-25 7.3 11.4 3.8 22.4 5.6
(5) 26-30 2.3 .8 5.4 8.5 2.3
(6) 31-35 1.0 1.0 0 2.1 11.8
(7) >35 13.1 2.2 0 15.3 1.8
Total 41.5 41.1 17.4 100.0 100.0
Note: For the calculation of the higher interest rate alternative, see Appendix 1.
Data are for the 60 largest casualty insurance groups, representing about 90 percent of industry assets.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Database of Annual Statements.
companies with capital less than 10 percent of assets (Table 7, last
column).
The capital of these insurers is sensitive to changes in yields because
the average maturity of their bonds exceeds 10 years and the average
"maturity" of their loss payments is approximately 2.5 years. In essence,
with rising interest rates, established insurers sell their bonds at a loss to
pay current claims. If these insurers retain their bonds and avoid
reporting their capital loss after yields rise, then they will report a
substandard rate of return on investments over the next decade. If they
also price their new policies very attractively in order to increase their
cash flow, they may also report substandard underwriting income.
Whether or not established insurers sell their bonds after interest rates
rise, the consequences ultimately are the same for their ratios of capital
and surplus to assets.
Risk Overconcentrations in Large Insurance
CompaniesmSimilarities to Recent Experience
with Banks
When this conference was conceived in the fall of 1990, solvency
risk in large insurance companies was only just becoming an area of
concern outside the industry, primarily as a result of well-publicized36 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
losses at two of the largest firms and worries about the real estate
exposure of these and other widely recognized companies. The general
public had at most only vague awareness of the rapid growth of a
number of life insurance companies, almost unknown a few years before
but now major players in the issuance of interest-sensitive products
invested in high-yield assets. In 1991, the general public has awakened
to the fact that large insurance companies can go from seemingly good
health and strong ratings to disastrous failures in a few months--a point
particularly clear to the many people whose retirement funds are in a
First Executive GIC or a First Capital annuity.
These two relatively large insurers have now officially failed.
Several other life insurance companies have shown similar patterns of
very rapid growth and concentrations in high-yield (junk) bonds and
risky commercial real estate equity investments or mortgages. Some of
the large multi-line companies also have developed unusually high
concentrations in such assets. The widespread overbuilding problems in
commercial real estate in some markets and the collapse of the junk
bond market raise concern that many companies with concentrations in
such assets could take substantial losses.
One important question is the degree to which the insurance .
industry will experience additional failures over the next few years as a
consequence of current junk bond and real estate exposures. Whatever
the answer, current asset quality problems already present sufficient
danger to the industry to warrant an examination of how they occurred
and how they might have been prevented. Such an analysis is essential
in evaluating the current regulatory and supervisory structure and
proposed improvements.
In order to examine the consequences of recent and current asset
quality exposures, several relatively large insurance companies that
show very rapid growth, unusual concentrations in the riskier asset
categories, or well-publicized solvency problems were identified. Indi-
vidual case studies of these companies were developed from annual
reports, NAIC data, press reports, and other published material. The
intent was to support some generalizations as to any common dimen-
sions in risk-taking.
In analyzing these cases a striking and consistent pattern of risk-
taking was found among a number of insurance companies, along with
certain strong similarities to the major credit problems experienced by
many of the larger banks in the past dozen years. Characteristics
common to the bank and insurance cases are:
(1) Several years of rapid growth in one or a few types of assets
with high inherent risk characteristics, leading to abnormal risk
concentrations.
(2) Profitable operations, maintenance of satisfactory capital ratios,INSURANCE COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 37
and high regard from the markets and public during this period
of rapid growth.
(3) A turning point in economic circumstances, adversely affecting
the areas of risk concentration.
(4) An accelerating loss of value in the risk asset categories,
showing up in nonperformance, default, or falling market
values, and eventually as charge-offs and falling capital ratios.
(5) Liquidity pressures as customers belatedly rush to withdraw
funds and rapid disposition of assets becomes impossible with-
out incurring unacceptable losses.
The next part of this section describes how these characteristics
manifested themselves in various banking crises. The third summarizes
the insurance case studies, showing how these same elements are
present. (Excerpts from the studies themselves are included in Appen-
dix 2 of this paper.) The final part discusses the implications of this
analysis for the regulation and supervision of both banks and insurance
companies.
Recent Threats to the Solvency of the Banking Industry
Failures and near failures of large commercial banks have so
damaged the bank insurance fund and weakened the industry that some
are questioning the ability of the industry to absorb future losses and
rebuild the fund without government assistance. The bulk of the losses
to the bank insurance fund can be attributed to a few relatively large
banks, and the limited capacity of the banking system to quickly restore
the fund is largely a function of the negative impact of unusual credit
losses on the profitability of the larger banks.
The bulk of these unusual credit losses in banks has been associated
with three major events: the overlending to less developed countries in
the 1970s, the Southwestern energy and real estate boom and bust cycle
of the early 1980s, and the commercial real estate overbuilding cycle in
New England and other portions of the Atlantic seaboard in the mid to
late 1980s.
Loans to less developed countries (LDCs). The money center banks (and
many large foreign banks) extended a very large volume of credit to
LDCs in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, it became apparent that the local
economies could not support the servicing and eventual repayment of
the large volume of bank credit. As of year end 1990, the combination of
cumulative charge-offs by the money center banks and their current
special reserves against such loans exceeded their total year-end 1982
capital. Nearly all of the LDC loans that gave rise to these losses were
already on the books by 1982. Accordingly, it could be argued that the
money center banks as a group were essentially insolvent by that time,38 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
had the full loss potential in the LDC loans been recognized. Fortu-
nately, these banks were able to earn their way out of this problem over
a number of years,
The example of the LDC lending demonstrates the first four
characteristics listed above, even though the resolution of the problem
was drawn out over a number of years and no major liquidity problems
or failures resulted. The main point to be made is that the risk was built
in before the end of 1982, and uncontrollable events turned that risk into
losses sufficient to exhaust the capital of our largest banks. After 1982,
the best that supervisors could do was to attempt to manage the
problem, but it was far too late for them to influence materially the
dimensions of the problem. This would have required action to limit the
risk concentration in the late 1970s.
Southwestern energy and real estate crisis. The larger banks in the
Southwest, as well as some large banks from outside the region,
financed an oil boom in the 1978-83 period. The resulting concentration
in energy credits in Texas and Oklahoma banks contributed to the
eventual demise of nearly all of the larger banks in these states as well
as the failure of Continental Illinois and the forced sale of Seafirst in
Seattle. These banks were well regarded during the period of heavy
energy lending, and only became of concern to supervisors and market
forces after the boom collapsed.
The risk exposure of Texas banks was compounded by their
financing of a real estate construction boom that not only coincided with
the energy boom, but continued for a time after the energy cycle turned
sour. The recognition of problems in the form of nonperforming
mortgage loans came only after much of the exposure had been built in.
Eventually seven of the eight largest commercial banking institutions in
Texas effectively failed, as a result of losses on a combination of energy
and real estate loans.7 Capital ratios declined only after the cycle turned
and substantial losses were inevitable.
New England overbuilding boom. New England banks engaged in a
rapid increase in construction and commercial real estate lending in the
1985 to 1988 period. The increase in nonperforming real estate loans
(predominantly commercial and construction-type loans), however, did
not become of concern until after the bulk of the risk exposure had been
built in and overbuilding became a drag on the market.
In the past year and one-half, most of the large New England banks
have become troubled, Bank of New England has failed, and some large
savings banks have become insolvent, all largely due to losses on
7 Three of the eight banks were acquired without federal assistance but experienced
subsequent losses sufficient to make it clear that they were effectively insolvent when
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mortgage loans made during the period of rapid growth. As with the
Texas banks, capital ratios fell only after losses developed, and well after
the risk exposure had been built in.
Similarities in the Pattern of Risk Concentrations in Large
Insurance Companies
Case studies of 11 insurance companies will be used to demonstrate
the developing patterns of risk concentrations in insurance companies
and compare them to corresponding patterns in banks. The cases were
not selected by rigid criteria, but they do cover some of the most
risk-concentrated among the larger firms in the industry. The smallest
company studied was Monarch Life, which had assets of $4.5 billion in
1990; some of the largest U.S. companies are also included.
First Executive, First Capital, and a few others were selected
because of their extremely rapid growth by issuing interest-sensitive
products that demanded investment in high-yielding assets. Baldwin-
United and Monarch Life are examples of firms that originally got into
trouble because of particular features of their interest-sensitive products.
Additional companies were included because of unusually heavy con-
centrations in particular categories of high-risk assets, less directly tied
to liability concentrations.
The case studies do not go into great detail but are intended to
identify the fundamental problems or areas of exposure. Five of the
cases represent companies that failed or have been seized by regulators
while at the other extreme are companies whose risk concentrations may
never develop into solvency-threatening problems. Only the companies. ¯
that failed or have been seized will be identified.
First Executive (assets $19 billion) and First Capital (assets $10 billion),
which failed shortly before this was written, represent cases of excessive
concentrations in junk bonds, built up over the 1980s. Both companies
were generally well regarded until after the junk bond market collapsed
in late 1989 and 1990.8 Thereafter, these companies experienced 12 to 15
months of increasingly evident depreciation of their portfolios as well as
declines in their bond ratings and the market value of their stock.9
Eventually, heavy charge-offs produced declines in their capital ratios.
As the end approached, the two companies became subject to increasing
regulatory pressures and both experienced accelerating runs in the form
See Hector (1984).
See Kerwin (1990); Crosson (1991); Stein (1991); and Rundle (1991).40 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
of policy lapses and surrenders, which eventually forced regulators to
seize the operating companies. 10
These events fit precisely the list of common characteristics identi-
fied earlier and demonstrated in the previous section for selected
groupings of banks. Of course the particular circumstances differ from
the bank experiences---banks themselves cannot hold junk bonds and
the nature of their liabilities is still quite different, although not so
different for these GIC and annuity issuers as for more traditional life
insurance companies.
The bankruptcy of Baldwin-United (assets $9 billion) in September
1983 was the largest insurance failure in the country until First Executive
failed this year. In essence, it involved a concentration risk stemming
from an interest rate mismatch on its principal product, single-payment
deferred annuities, although the full story is much more complex.
The NAIC in February 1985 published a study of the case in which
it stated (p. 14) that "the efforts of insurance regulators should be aimed
primarily at the prevention of insolvencies .... " It also emphasized
diversification and regulatory vigilance. Unfortunately, it appears that
the lessons learned in the Baldwin-United case have not been effectively
implemented, as evidenced by the various excessive concentrations that
have developed recently.
Monarch (assets $4.5 billion) was a leader in sales of variable life in
the 1980s. Its best-selling product was vulnerable to stock market
movements and relied on a particular tax provision. The market crash in
1987 and tax law changes at about the same time eliminated the
advantages of these features and a resulting decline in volume left
Monarch somewhat overextended in bank debt.
The parent company invested heavily in New England commercial
real estate development financed by bank debt. In November 1990
serious problems with the parent’s holdings became apparent, and in
May 1991, the life company was seized by the authorities to protect it
from the parent’s bankruptcy proceedings.11 This case involves two
successive risk concentrations, either of which might have been consid-
ered excessive even prior to an adverse change in the economic
environment.
Mutual Benefit Life (assets $14 billion) became a heavy issuer of GICs
and holder of commercial real estate assets in the mid 1980s. The
announcement of a high volume of foreclosures and other troubled real
estate assets earlier this year triggered a policyholder run that led to the
seizure of the company by the state authorities.
See Rose and Hilder (1991); Shapiro (1991); Rose (1991a); Stevenson (1991); and Rose
(1991b).
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Of the remaining six cases, two were primarily life companies, three
were multi-line, and one was predominantly a property-casualty com-
pany. Looking at the 11 cases together, all but one had a heavy
concentration in either junk bonds/leveraged buyouts or assets related
to commercial real estate, and three had concentrations in both catego-
ries. With respect to junk bonds/LBOs, First Executive and First Capital
had concentrations in the range of 40 to 50 percent of invested assets,
while four others were in the 14 to 20 percent range. Five companies had
real-estate-related assets, mostly commercial mortgages and joint ven-
ture real estate, in the 38 to 55 percent range (not including the parent
of Monarch Life). All but two of the companies with heavy concentra-
tions in the riskiest assets have shown some significant decline in asset
quality following adverse changes in the market forces affecting those
particular assets. Nine of the 11 companies studied had specialized in
single-payment deferred annuities, GICs, or some form of universal or
variable life, leading to some degree of interest sensitivity concentration.
In four cases, interest rate risk has resulted in significant losses.
Each of the cases described involves several years of buildup of one
or more risk concentrations, accompanied by high market regard and
acceptable capital ratios. Eventually, each area of concentration was
adversely affected by some economic event that, in nearly every case,
quickly transformed risk into some degree of actual difficulty. In several
of the cases studied, the resulting problems were serious enough to at
least raise questions about the survivability of the institution.
The cases demonstrate what one might expect with regard to the
timing of capital ratio deterioration. Capital ratios can generally be
maintained in rapid growth situations either by high profitability or by
capital issuance. Capital ratios deteriorate only after a problem develops
to the point where losses are taken. Some of the institutions studied had
capital deterioration before the effects of junk bond or real estate
write-downs, but in nearly every case this was the result of other
concentration problems, such as interest rate mismatches. As in the case
of banks, capital ratios generally drop only after problems mature and
long after risk concentrations are allowed to develop.
Finally, the First Executive, First Capital, and Mutual Benefit cases
have demonstrated dramatically how runs on insurance companies can
develop, once concerns about solvency become widespread. The reso-
lution of these cases will also be instructive as to the effectiveness of
state guaranty funds and the priorities that should be given to various
creditor classes in the liquidation of insurance companies.12
See Durgin (1991); Haggerty and Connolly (1991); and Rose (1991c).42 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
Implications for the Regulation of Insurance Companies
The principal conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that
insurance companies, like banks, appear prone to develop major risk
concentrations that can imperil the solvency of a significant portion of
the industry, under certain economic conditions. If such risk concentra-
tions are allowed to develop, and conditions transform these risk
exposures into actual problems, supervisory authorities can do little
except to manage the resolution of the damaged institutions. At that
point, supervisors have little opportunity to materially decrease the
magnitude of losses to individual companies.
This implies that the supervisors should be expected to have the
analytical tools and to exercise the responsibility to intervene forcefully
when risk concentrations are becoming excessive. Based on the cases
studied, this would appear to be a radical departure from the current
practice. In recent years, banks’ risk concentrations have not always
received the attention they should have, and vigorous action has been
taken only after the cycle turned and actual problems became apparent.
It appears that the same can be said for insurance company supervisors.
The evaluation of risk concentrations is not a highly developed art
form, and can sometimes be complex. Risk concentrations have many
dimensions and sometimes covariances exist that can either mitigate or
aggravate risks. Furthermore, it usually is not enough merely to apply
static risk criteria to concentrations in particular types of assets, because
the economic environment that will influence the behavior of these
assets may be critical. Thus, new techniques and standards are needed
in order to enable supervisors to take appropriately timed action against
risk concentrations that are becoming excessive.
Some prefer to rely on regulation rather than supervision because it
does not require the exercise of judgment. For example, some proposals
would limit insurance companies’ investment in junk bonds to a fixed
percentage of invested assets. It is probably impossible to set a simple
cut-off point low enough to prevent dangerous concentrations in most
situations, without unduly restricting appropriate actions in other
situations. Even imperfect supervisory judgment will generally do a
better job than simple limitations, if the supervisory standards are
thoughtfully constructed.
Once again, consideration of developments in banking is instruc-
tive. Among the proposals to "reform" bank supervision is the concept
of "early" or "progressive" intervention based on capital ratios. The
theory is that strongly capitalized banks would be generally free of
supervisory constraints, but as capital ratios fell, progressively severe
supervisory actions would be taken. This concept does not square with
the recent experiences of the large banks or the insurance company
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not decline in the risk-taking phase, and by the time they do, late in the
problem realization phase, it is too late for even harsh supervisory action
to avoid the consequences of the built-in problems.
Progressive intervention may be a desirable end-game supervisory
tool, but it should not be represented as a means of avoiding costly
failures, and certainly should not be linked to a policy of relaxed
supervision of well-capitalized companies. Neither banks nor insurance
companies should be allowed to develop dangerous risk concentrations
merely because they have above-average capital ratios.
Conclusion
Traditionally, both life and property-liability insurance companies
have invested their policyholders’ reserves in long-term securities. This
strategy provided businesses with a substantial flow of long-term
financing at attractive prices. Furthermore, this strategy allowed insur-
ers to offer their customers relatively attractive returns on their con-
tracts, because the yields on long-term securities exceeded those of
shorter-term securities.
Though this strategy is attractive, it also is risky. The increase in
¯ yields during the 1970s and 1980s left insurance companies and their
policyholders holding assets offering below-market rates of return.
Insurers that no longer offered their customers a competitive rate of
return lost business, whereas insurers that continued to offer their
policyholders competitive returns, absorbing, the losses themselves,
diminished both their return on capital and subsequently their capital
relative to their assets. Some insurers attempted to increase their return
on surplus by acquiring a riskier portfolio of assets or by writing a
substantial volume of new contracts in order to invest the proceeds in
new long-term securities. Any of these steps increases the odds of
insurers’ failing to honor their contracts fully because of unexpected
underwriting losses or unexpected increases in rates of interest.
In retrospect, 20 years ago insurers carried too little capital to
adequately cover their bets against rising interest rates. Today, the
capitalization of most insurers is less than that of the 1970s, while the
risks inherent in their assets and liabilities have not diminished.
The problems that have already emerged in the insurance industries
are similar in certain respects to those that have emerged in the banking
industry. These common experiences demonstrate that supervisory
authorities can avert problems only if they have the ability and the
authority to prevent insurers from assuming excessive risk at an early
stage, well before economic events entail future losses.44 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
Appendix 1: Calculations for Table 7
Using the NAIC reports for each of the 60 largest property-liability groups for 1989,
the change in capital and surplus equals the change in the value of the groups’ bonds, plus
the change in the value of common stock, less the change in the value of the groups’
expected loss payments.
The change in the value of the bond portfolio when interest rates increase 3
percentage points equals
{ ml(C
AB = ~ + X(1 - X)’ - 1)/(1 + C + .03)’ + (1 - X)nl- 1/(1 q- C + .03)m
- ~=1 ~ (C + X(1 - X)~- 1)/(1 + C)~ - (1 - X)m 1/(1 q- c)m}"~B.
B is the value of bonds held by the group,
M is the average maturity of bonds (from Schedule D of the NAIC Annual Statement),
C is the average coupon payment on bonds (interest income on bonds divided by B), and
X is the rate at which bonds are prepaid (.05).
The change in the value of common stock when dividend-price ratios rise 1
percentage point equals
AS/S = - ((D/P) - 1 _ (D/P) + .01) - 1) ~ (D/P).
S is the value of common stocks held by the group, and
D/P is the dividend-price ratio for those stocks.
The change in the value of loss payments when interest rates increase 3 percentage
points equals
AR/R = - ((1.09) - D _ (1.12) - D) ~ (1.09)D.
R is losses and loss adjustment expenses, and
D is the average maturity of loss payments (from Schedule P of the NAIC Annual Statement).
The "typical profile" of payments for a given year’s losses is the average of the
profiles of reported payments, beginning with 1980. Then, taking into account the
vintages of reserves and the profiles of their remaining payments (calculated from the
"typical profile"), D is the weighted mean of the timing of expected future payments.
Because D estimates the average maturity of payments, the foregoing formula (a duration
equation using an initial return of 9 percent) tends to overstate the change in the value of
these liabilities. This bias, which is small because D is near 2.5, tends to reduce the
estimated loss of capital.INSURANCE COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES




The company, established in the early 1960s, was small and unprofitable when Fred
Cart became CEO in 1974. Growth started in 1975 and accelerated by 1980, with emphasis
on single-payment deferred annuities invested primarily in junk bonds. Carr involved the
company in numerous junk bond deals with Drexel Burnham Lambert’s Michael Milken.
When annuity sales plummeted in 1983 following the failure of Baldwin-United, First
Executive was already expanding in life insurance products similar to universal life.
Nonetheless, with the failure of Baldwin-United and Charter Corp., First Executive
became the largest seller of annuities in the country. By 1983, First Executive was one of
the 10 largest underwriters of new life insurance policies.
In 1986, much of First Executive’s growth was in issuing GICs for pensions and
substituting annuities for terminated pensions, sometimes in conjunction with leveraged
buyouts. An innovation was the issuance of GICs to municipalities, which invested in
junk-backed GICs instead of using the proceeds of municipal bonds for projects. Capital
ratios, unadjusted for risk, declined sharply in the mid 1980s to a low in 1987, then began
to recover. However, the company was considered to be weakly capitalized relative to its
peers.
First Executive was generally well-regarded in the mid 1980s and achieved an AAA
rating from Standard & Poor’s Corp. in 1985. Despite periodic articles raising questions
about Carr’s relationship to Drexel Burnham Lambert and his infatuation with junk bonds,
as well as recurring problems with allegedly invalid reinsurance and allegedly misleading
financial statements (in 1987), First Executive appears to have been much admired for its
innovative products and growth. 13 Concerns about the concentration in junk bonds were
apparently raised by supervisors in New York as early as 1985. However, it was not until
the junk bond market collapsed in late 1989 and 1990 that widespread concerns emerged.
Problelns
(1) Asset quality. The essential problem was the extremely high concentration of
invested assets in junk bonds, 42 percent as early as 1985 and somewhat higher later. As
the junk bond market unraveled, First Executive was downgraded by the rating agencies.
In January 1990, it was reduced to Baa2 by Moody’s following an announcement that First
Executive would write down bonds by as much as $515 million. Reportedly this would still
leave a depreciation of $1.4 billion on junk. Moody’s dropped First Executive’s rating to a
junk level, Ba2, in February 1990.
As troubles continued to mount, First Executive was forced to withdraw from New
Jersey in December 1990 and from Massachusetts in March 1991 because of pressure from
supervisors. Moody’s dropped its rating to B1 in March. Following the release in April of
year-end financials that showed a 44 percent drop in capital, supervisory action was
stepped up. New York required a capital injection of $125 million into the subsidiary in
that state and ordered a suspension of new business. Shortly thereafter California seized
the unit in that state and a few days later New York seized its unit in order to halt massive
withdrawals.
(2) Liquidity. With changes in tax laws, some of First Executive’s products became
unattractive. Surrenders and policy loans increased sharply in 1989, and management
sought to increase cash to meet growing liquidity needs. Following announcement of
a major write-off of junk bonds in January 1990, concerns were widespread about a run
on First Executive’s liabilities, but the rating agencies considered liquidity sufficient to
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handle lapses. In the first half of 1990 more than $2.6 billion in policies and GICs were
surrendered.
By late 1990 First Executive was faced with insufficient cash to continue its preferred
dividend or to service its debt, and there was concern that the parent company would be
forced into bankruptcy. As the crisis worsened in the spring of 1991, regulators were
forced to seize the two life insurance units as outflows accelerated, as noted above.
Analysis
First Executive grew extremely rapidly and was highly concentrated in risky activity,
but was generally well-regarded until its fortunes suddenly turned in 1990 as a result of
economic events beyond its control. By early 1991 it had failed, with a potential for major
losses to pension plans and other holders of GICs and annuities. Despite a number of
assertions that insurance companies are not subject to bank-style runs, the two First
Executive units were subject to prolonged runs as worries grew, and a final hemorrhage
forced their closure by supervisors.
This case fits the model depicted earlier for banks very well. However, the signs of
extreme overconcentration and potential mismanagement were apparent at a particularly
early stage.
Current Status
Since the seizure of both of the principal units of First Executive, much speculation
has occurred as to the amount of the loss that must be absorbed and who will absorb it.
The issue was further complicated by an Internal Revenue Service demand on April 22,
1991 for $643 million in unpaid taxes. The First Executive failure has sparked much debate
as to the adequacy of the system of guaranty funds, the duty and practical ability of
customer firms to protect their retired employees in such circumstances, and the priorities
for the disbursement of limited funds to various classes of claimants.
First Capital Holdings Corporation
History
Established in 1983, the company grew rapidly through acquisitions and aggressive
marketing. In November 1988, Shearson Lehman bought a 28.6 percent interest.
Problems
First Capital specialized in universal life and interest-sensitive annuities, and
invested heavily in junk bonds. Such bonds equaled 39.0 percent of total investments as
of 12/31/90. Tangible equity capital equaled only 9.2 percent of junk bonds, while
depreciation equaled 23.7 percent of junk. Nonperforming junk was 7.8 percent of total
junk bonds after heavy charge-offs in the final quarter of 1990.
It was not clear from the 1990 annual report whether lapse rates had become a
problem, or whether liquidity was adequate to avoid forced liquidation of junk bonds, but
it soon became clear that a liquidity problem existed. (See Current Status, below.)
Tangible equity capital has been about 3 percent of total assets at year-end 1988, 1989,
and 1990. However, if securities depreciation is netted, this measure declines from 1.6
percent to 1 percent for 1989 and to negative 4.2 percent at the end of 1990.
Assets relating to deferred sales costs and the present value of future earnings on
insurance policies in force were very large relative to tangible capital, 2.4 times tangible
equity in 1990.14 In view of the increase in lapse rates above assumptions, these assets have
presumably shrunk rapidly in real value.
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Analysis
Until late in 1990 or early 1991 the financial data suggested, at least superficially, a
successful, rapidly growing, and profitable company (ROA 0.74 percent and ROE 18.2
percent in 1989). However, the concentration in junk bonds that had been a feature of the
company’s structure for several years was so large that significant credit loss, or a need to
sell bonds into a distressed market due to unexpected lapses, was sufficient to easily wipe
out capital and cause major losses to policyholders. The junk bond crash of the 1989-90
period and the current recession caused both events, and failure became inevitable.
Holding company debt was rated Ba2 by Moody’s from the time when Shearson acquired
an interest until January 28, 1991, when the rating dropped to B1. The rating was dropped
three more times in May.
No degree of vigorous supervisory action in 1990 or 1991 could have changed the
basic outcome. That would have required action to force diversification well before the
junk market collapsed. Because the costs of the interest-sensitive annuities could only be
covered by high-yield assets, it would have been necessary to constrain the basic business
of this company at an early stage in its development, either through judgmental
application of supervisory pressure or through regulation (or perhaps a combination of the
two).
Current Status
Staff was reduced 18.1 percent in 1990. The CEO resigned in March 1991. The
California Insurance Commissioner is talking to American Express, seeking a rescue.
About 75 percent of the business has been generated through Shearson Lehman Brothers
in recent years. Apparently American Express will seek to protect only Shearson
customers.
The stock of First Capital traded as high as $14.125 in late 1989, but fell throughout
1990. It dropped to $.9375 on May 8, 1991.
On May 8, the California Commissioner declared the First Capital Life unit to be in
hazardous condition and issued a cease and desist order suspending redemptions, loans,
and sales of new business. Redemption requests had surged from $10 million a day two
weeks earlier to $100 million on May 7. Concern was being expressed about a 12 percent
delinquency rate on mortgage loans in addition to the junk bonds.
On May 8, American Express charged off its entire $144 million investment in First
Capital, and the junk bond market was hurt by fears that regulators would require
dumping of junk bonds by First Capital.
On May 13, the Virginia Commissioner of Insurance seized the other principal
subsidiary, Fidelity Bankers Life, based in Richmond, and on May 15, the California
Commissioner seized First Capital Life following a bankruptcy petition by creditors.
Baldwin-United Corp.
History
From 1977 through 1982 this company grew rapidly, both through internal expansion
and numerous acquisitions. The principal product was single-payment deferred annuities
(SPDAs), and the company was so successful with these that it was the envy of Wall Street
in the early 1980s (NAIC 1985, pg. 9). In March 1982, Baldwin acquired MGIC Investment
Corp for $1.2 billion after receiving various regulatory approvals.
By late 1982 problems began to surface, and by September 1983 the company was
bankrupt.
Problems
(1) A fatal flaw in the SPDAs allowed holders to surrender the annuities without
penalty if the interest crediting rate was reduced more than 75 basis points. When rates
fell, Baldwin was forced to operate with a negative spread to avoid surrenders.
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various intercompany transactions, including reinsurance within the family, made analy-
sis very difficult. Losses were transferred among subsidiaries with different tax rates
allowing the booking of a large volume of tax credits, which in the end proved worthless.
Analysis
The actual problem was not publicly recognized until late 1982, but the regulators
appear to have been concerned that the consolidated company might be insolvent in the
summer of 1982 (NAIC 1985, p. 10). The risk was built in the previous few years while
interest rates were soaring, and quickly showed up as rates plummeted in 1982. Baldwin
was a classic interest mismatch case with a number of complicating factors that made it
difficult to sort out.
Resolution
Until recently, Baldwin was the largest insurance company failure in this country. Its
resolution, like its problem, was complex. The loss was met in part by retail stock brokers
who had sold its annuities, by lending banks, and by state guaranty funds.
Monarch Life
History
Monarch, located in Springfield, Massachusetts, had total assets of $4.5 billion as
recently as the fall of 1990 when it sold its variable life business. It currently has assets of
only $1.5 billion. Monarch expanded rapidly in the 1980s with innovative variable life and
disability products. It sold variable life, where the customer directed funds into the stock
investments to obtain a tax advantage. Such advantages were wiped out in 1987 by the
stock market crash and tax law changes. Sales volume fell and the insurance company was
overextended with bank debt.
In an effort to recover, the parent company, Monarch Capital, invested heavily in
real estate development and venture capital deals, primarily in New England, financed by
bank debt.
Problem
In November 1990, the parent reported a significant loss due to real estate problems,
triggering a default on bank debt, replacement of the CEO, and efforts to sell the life
company. In early May 1991, the Massachusetts authorities seized the life company to
protect it from the bankruptcy proceedings involving the parent. The insurance company
is reported to be in satisfactory condition with $100 million in capital, but few details are
available. Reports circulated of heavy surrenders by policyholders.
Analysis
The original concentration in a particular variable life product was vulnerable to an
economic event that suddenly triggered a problem. The parent’s subsequent concentration
in high-risk real estate deals endangered the subsidiary when the collapse of real estate
values in New England forced it into bankruptcy.
Current Status
The authorities and the bank creditors of the parent are in discussion with potential




One of the 20 largest U.S. life insurers, with assets of nearly $14 billion, this company
had a concentration in real estate assets at year-end 1987 of 52 percent of total assets. This
ratio had declined to 39 percent by year-end 1990 as a result of growth in other
investments.
Problems
(1) While complete 1990 data have not been seen, newspaper accounts indicate a
sharp rise in real estate problems. Nonperforming mortgages jumped from 2.4 percent to
5.4 percent in 1990, and foreclosed property apparently amounts to $225 million.
(2) Surplus reportedly has been weakened by charge-offs as overall growth contin-
ued, and the ratio of surplus to assets, other than separate accounts, was about 4.3 percent
at year-end 1990. Furthermore, press reports indicate that reported surplus was inflated by
surplus relief reinsurance transactions, which may have added $90 million to surplus in
1990. Adjusting for this would reduce the surplus ratio to 3.6 percent.
(3) Retired GICs were replaced with $100 million in commercial paper borrowing,
increasing liquidity vulnerability.
Analysis
While the history of this company’s real estate concentration was not investigated,
the company was apparently well-regarded despite its high concentration level until the
deterioration in commercial real estate markets became of concern. Once an actual
problem became apparent, the company became very vulnerable to liquidity pressures.
Current Status
An attempt to obtain a $100 million injection of capital from a major insurance
company collapsed in May and Standard & Poor’s lowered the debt rating four categories
to A. In the ensuing weeks, policyholders withdrew over $1 billion and the company was
forced to request that the New Jersey authorities take it over, which they did on July 15,
1991.~s
See Pulliam (1991b, d, and e),50 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
References
A.M. Best Company. 1990. Best’s Agents Guide to Life Insurance Companies 1990, 17th Annual
Edition. Oldwick, NJ: A.M. Best Company.
--. Best’ s Aggregates and Averages--Life/Health, various years.
--. Best’s Aggregates and Averages--Property/Casualty, various years.
American Council of Life Insurance. 1990. Report of the ACLI Task Force on Solvency Concerns.
Washington, D.C., September.
--. Various years. Life Insurance Fact Book. Washington, D.C.
Baskin, Jonathan Barron. 1988. "The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in
Britain and the United States, 1600-1914: Overcoming Asymmetric Information."
Business History Review, vol. 62, Summer, pp. 199-237.
Belth, Joseph M., ed. 1987a. "The Reinsurance Disaster at Executive Life." The Insurance
Forum, May, pp. 161-64.
.1987b. "More on the Reinsurance Disaster at Executive Life." The Insurance Forum,
June 1987, pp. 165-68.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler. 1987. "Banking and Macroeconomic Equilibrium." In
William A. Barnet and Kenneth Singleton, eds., New Approaches to Monetary Economics,
pp. 89-111. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1990. Flow of Funds Accounts. Financial
Assets and Liabilities, Year-End 1966-1989. December.
Borman, Thomas H. 1991. "Hitting the Mark on Real Estate Values." Best’s Review, April,
pp. 18-20, 92-93¯
Council of Economic Advisers. 1991. Economic Report of the President. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office.
Crosson, Cynthia. 1991. "Executive Life Unit’s Capital Fell 44% in 1990." National
Underwriter Life & Health/Financial Services Edition, March 18, pp. 1, 21, 24.
Dia~nond, Douglas W. 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring." Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 51, pp. 393M14.
Diamond, Douglas W. and Philip H. Dybvig. 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance
Liquidity." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 401-419.
Durgin, Hillary. 1991. "Participants May Sue Over GICs, Annuities." Pensions & Invest-
ments, April 29, pp. 1, 33.
Fama, Eugene F. 1985¯ "What’s Different About Banks?" Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.
15, January, pp. 29-39.
First Capital Holdings Company. 1988, 1989, 1990. Annual Report.
Gertler, Mark. 1988. "Financial Structure and Economic Activity: An Overview." National
Bureau of Economic Research, working paper no. 2559, April.
Goldsmith, Raymond W. 1955. A Study of Saving in the United States. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
¯ 1958. Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since 1900. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Gurley, John G. and Edward S. Shaw. 1955. "Financial Aspects of Economic Develop-
ment." The American Economic Review, vol. 45, September, pp. 515-38.
. 1956. "Financial Intermediaries in the Saving-Investment Process." Journal of
Finance, vol. 11, March, pp. 257-76.
. 1960. Money in a Theory of Finance. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Haggerty, Alfred G. and Jim Connotly. 1991. "Garamendi: First Capital Is Shearson’s
Responsibility." National Underwriter Life & Health/Financial Services Edition, May 13,
pp. 1, 31.
Hector, Gary. 1984. "A Go-Go Insurer Adds Zest to Life." Fortune, March 5, pp. 51-56.
Homer, Sidney. 1963. A History of Interest Rates. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein. 1989. "Bank Monitoring and
Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking
Relations." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Econom-
ics Discussion Series, no. 110, August.
IDS Financial Services. 1990. Will the U.S. Life Insurance Industry Keep Its Protnises?
Minneapolis, MN, March.INSURANCE COMPANIES AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 51
Insurance Information Institute¯ Various years. Property/Casualty Insurance Fact Book. New
York.
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics,
vol. 3, pp. 305-360.
Kerwin, Kathleen. 1990. "The Avalanche of Junk Burying First Executive." Business Week,
February 26, p. 41.
Kopcke, Richard W. and Eric S. Rosengren. 1989. "Regulation of Debt and Equity." In
Kopcke, Richard W. and Eric S. Rosengren, eds., Are the Distinctions between Debt and
Equity Disappearing? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 33,
October.
Kramer, Orin. 1990¯ Rating the Risks: Assessing the Solvency Threat in the Financial Services
Industry, December 31. New York, NY: Insurance Information Institute.
Laing, Jonathan R. 1990. "Flawed Policies." Barron’s, October 1.
Leland, Hayne E. and David H. Pyle. 1977. "Information Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation." Journal of Finance, vol. 32, May, pp. 371-87.
National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 1984 to 1989. NAIC Database Tapes of
the annual statements, Life/Health data for all companies, 1984 to 1989. Property/
Casualty data for all companies, 1984 to 1989.
--. 1985. "The Baldwin-United Bankruptcy: Its Significance for Insurance Regula-
tion." February.
Navin, Thomas R. and Marian V. Sears¯ 1955. "The Rise of a Market for Industrial
Securities, 1887-1902." Business History Review, vol. 30, pp. 105-38.
Pulliam, Susan. 1990¯ "Monarch Capital May Find Itself Forced to Liquidate or File
Bankruptcy Petition." Wall Street Journal, December 10.
---. 1991a. "Monarch Capital Posts 4th-Period Loss, Plans to Turn Over the Life
Insurance Unit." Wall Street Journal, April 3.
--. 1991b. "Metropolitan Life Rejects a Proposal From Mutual Benefit for Cash
Infusion." Wall Street Journal, May 17.
--. 1991c. "Regulators Take Over Monarch Life, Keeping Creditors From Seizing
Assets." Wall Street Journal, May 31.
--. 1991d. "Mutual Benefit Life Is Expected to Ask State to Take Over as Early as
Today." Wall Street Journal, July 15.
--. 1991e. "New Jersey Takes Over Mutual Benefit Amid Surrender of $1 Billion in
Policies¯" Wall Street Journal, July 16.
Randall, Richard E. 1989. "Can the Market Evaluate Asset Quality Exposure in Banks?"
New England Economic Review, July/August, pp. 3-24.
Rose, Frederick. 1991a. "First Capital Unit’s Payouts Are Prohibited." Wall Street Journal,
May 13.
¯ 1991b. "California Takes Control of Unit of First Capital." Wall Street Journal. May
15.
¯ 1991c. "Executive Life Restructuring Plan Is Proposed." Wall Street Journal, May 22.
¯ 1991d. "Executive Life Had Year-End Deficit, Witness Testifies¯" Wall Street Jour-
nal, June 7.
Rose, Frederick and David B. Hilder. 1991. "JunkBond Deals Trip Insurer as State Seizes
Unit of First Executive." Wall Street Journal, April 12.
Rundle, Rhonda R. 1991. "First Capital Boosts Its Loss Reserves, Weighs Asset Sale;
Chairman Resigns." Wall Street Journal, March 18.
Shapiro, Eben. 1991. "New York Takes Over Big Insurer." The New York Times, April 17.
Shulman, David. 1990. "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: The Coming Default Crisis in
Commercial Mortgages." Salomon Brothers Bond Market Research, Real Estate, June 14.
Simons, Katerina. 1991¯ "Do Capital Markets Predict Problems in Large Commercial
Banks?" New England Economic Review, May/June.
Sloan, Alan and Howard Rudnitsky. 1984. "Taking in Each Other’s Laundry." Forbes,
November 19, pp. 207-22.
Smith, Clifford W. and Jerold B. Warner. 1979. "On Financial Contracting¯" Journal of
Financial Economics, vol¯ 7, June, pp. 117-161.
Stein, Benjamin J. 1991. "Sunk by Junk: First Executive’s Woes Put Policyholders at Risk."
Barron’s, April 1, pp. 8, 9, 23-25.52 Richard W. Kopcke and Richard E. Randall
Stevenson, Merril. 1990. "A Question of Balance: A Survey of American Insurance/’ The
Economist, October 27, pp. $5-$20.
Stevenson, Richard W. 1991. "Virginia Seizes Insurer, A Unit of First Capital." The New
York Times, May 14.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce. 1990.
Failed Promises--Insurance Company Insolvencies. Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, February.
U.S. Department of the Treasury. 1991. Modernizing the Financial System. Washington,
D.C., February.Discussion
Jeffrey Cohen*
Richard Kopcke and Richard Randall have written an interesting
paper, which makes a number of important points. I would highlight
three in particular:
(1) Successful regulation could improve insurers’ diversification
and asset/liability matching but might require a resident shadow
management. I will refer to this as the regulator’s dilemma, and
come back to it later.
(2) Customers believe that regulated financial intermediaries are
less risky because of government guarantees. This in turn may
allow intermediaries to become riskier. The situation is very
similar to the one we have seen with the banks and S&Ls: I will
not discuss this point further.
(3) Kopcke and Randall outline a pattern of failure that applies to
both bank and insurance company insolvencies. This pattern
involves rapid growth, leading to concentration of risk, fol-
lowed by a change in economic circumstances that reduces asset
values. The final step is liquidity pressure. The pattern de-
scribed is a useful structure within which to examine troubled
insurance companies, in order to see where it does and does not
apply.
I will examine these issues from a different angle. Kopcke and Randall
focus mostly on the balance sheet; I will focus on the income statement
as well. I will also draw some contrasts between property-liability and
life insurance companies.
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First, the income statement versus the balance sheet: It is important
to remember that one key factor driving the increase in risk in the
insurance business is the decline in the industry’s profitability. It has
simply become harder for insurers to make money in many of their
traditional businesses. The industry’s return on equity has fallen.
Declining profitability is one of the things that leads company manage-
ment to take on more risk. In addition, we should remember that it will
be difficult for the industry to raise new capital if investors do not believe
they can make an adequate return on that capital.
My second topic is the differences between property-liability and
life insurers. Kopcke and Randall draw a number of parallels among
insurers, banks, and thrifts. However, property-liability insurers are
much less like depositories than are life companies. For example, the
decrease in property-liability companies’ capital-to-asset ratios is the
result of the industry’s shift from writing mostly property to writing
liability lines. Liability claims take longer to be paid and therefore build
up more assets. This does not necessarily mean companies are riskier,
provided loss reserves are adequate. Also, property-liability companies
do not hold many risky assets. A run on a property-liability company is
unlikely--claimants cannot accelerate payments. Insolvencies in this
industry are most likely to result from fraud, uncollectible reinsurance,
a major disaster such as a California earthquake, enormous company
payments for Superfund cleanups, or the slow erosion of companies’
financial strength during the industry’s down cycles, rather than from
asset-liability mismatching. This industry’s biggest problem is that it is
just not profitable enough. And that is because the industry has too
much structural capacity (too many companies) and too much capital,
not too little. Property-liability companies raise prices aggressively and
earn an adequate return only when their capital is declining and com-
pany managements perceive themselves as being in financial trouble.
Life insurers, as I mentioned, are more like banks. Nevertheless,
their liabilities are longer than banks’ and it is harder to have a run on
a life company. This should allow more time for companies to solve their
problems, which are principally due to a change in product mix. Selling
single-premium deferred annuities (SPDAs), guaranteed investment
contracts (GICs), and universal life is fundamentally different--and less
profitable--than selling whole life policies with conservative mortality
assumptions that pay low, fixed-interest rates. Company managements
did not fully understand the risks inherent in these new products when
they began to sell them. To give an example, in 1984 or 1985 1 called on
a medium-size life insurer that had recently hired a new chief invest-
ment officer from the mutual fund industry. I asked him a number of
questions about what interest rates they were crediting on universal life
policies and what they were investing policyholders’ funds in. It was
obvious that their rate spread was too narrow for the company to earnDISCUSSION 55
a reasonable return. When I pointed this out, the investment officer said
they would make up for it by trading the portfolio. And it was difficult
to argue with him because interest rates had fallen in the past few
months, so the company had earned large capital gains. Nevertheless, it
is pretty risky to try to run a company like that forever. In fact, I think
that if the true economics of GICs were understood--all the options
granted on both sides of the balance sheet were properly priced and the
line was adequately capitalized--insurers would find that they cannot
make a reasonable amount of money in the business.
Finally, although I will not discuss this in detail, I think we should
distinguish between the mismatch risk and the asset concentration risk
on life insurers’ balance sheets. Asset concentration is probably much
more dangerous, and more likely to put a company under.
In their conclusion, Kopcke and Randall seem to be calling for
regulatory intervention to occur earlier, before insurers can develop
excessive risk concentrations. They indicate that regulators must have
the proper analytical tools to assess risk, however, and they recognize
that this is a difficult task. This recommendation brings us back to the
regulator’s dilemma I referred to earlier. Many of the things companies
do that get them in trouble are not adequately understood at the time
they are done. Should regulators substitute their judgment for the
judgments of insurance company managements, the competitive mar-
ket, or the financial markets? Furthermore, regulators may have con-
flicting agendas--for example, to promote solvency yet keep insurance
affordable. Workers’ compensation is a highly regulated line, yet if a
Workers’ Compensation Insurance Company of America existed, it
might be bankrupt. Look at the auto insurance situation in California:
How can regulators reduce the price of auto insurance, satisfying
consumers, and still allow companies to make a reasonable return on
capital, as required by law?
Obviously, regulation can be improved. I would start with some
smaller, more concrete changes, however, before putting in a new
regulatory structure or expanding the current one.
First, I would move to mark-to-market accounting for all assets
and liabilities. Insurance companies’ assets and liabilities are
worth what they are carried for only by accident. Perhaps
marking bonds, mortgages, real estate, and loss reserves to
market will inject some discipline into the industry. It may not be
necessary for the GAAP (generally accepted accountingprinci-
ples) or statutory balance sheets to show market values. But if
not, the information should be prominently displayed in the
footnotes.
Second, I would remove some of the artificial barriers to consol-
idation. Why do state insurance departments think it is part of56 Jeffrey Cohen
their mission to protect existing managements as well as the
policyholders? Takeovers are very difficult to do in this industry,
yet the industry needs to consolidate in order to become more
efficient.
Third, the de-mutualization process should be made easier. This
would allow mutuals to raise capital and, as public companies,
they might be more disciplined and profit-oriented.
Fourth, banks should not be allowed into the insurance business.
Too many insurance companies are in business already. What
makes anyone think that we can solve the banks’ problems by
allowing their managements, who have already shown that they
are unable to manage their own business, into another over-
crowded, highly leveraged, narrow margin business?Discussion
Thomas E. Moloney*
I commend Richard Kopcke and Richard Randall on the breadth of
their analysis of insurers as financial intermediaries. Their paper re-
minds us all of the great stake that the entire economic community has
in the efficiency of operation and continued solvency of the insurance
industry. As they note, U.S. insurers manage over $1.3 trillion in assets,
including 36 percent of all corporate bonds and 28 percent of all
commercial mortgages. The insurance industry acts as a major financial
intermediary whose actions and policies influence the national and
international financial markets. My discussion will focus on the life
insurance industry.
Two Decades of Transition
As alluded to by Kopcke and Randall, the life insurance industry
has experienced significant change over the past 20 years. Customers’
conception of a life insurance policy has fundamentally shifted from
primarily a "widows-and-orphans" or long-term savings vehicle toward
a potentially short-term investment vehicle. Where in 1970 the typical
life insurance policy had a fixed premium and a fixed payment upon
maturity, today’s panoply of products ranges from strict, low-cost term
policies to flexible-premium variable life policies whose cash values are
tied to actual investment experience.
This fundamental change in both customer preferences and indus-
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pany.58 Thomas E. Moloney
try product offerings was brought about by the periods of high inflation
and concomitant interest rate volatility during the 1970s and early 1980s,
as well as by increased competition for customers’ savings from interest-
rate-sensitive investment vehicles like mutual funds and CDs offered by
other financial services companies. During these two decades, the
insurance industry continuously evolved in order to keep pace with the
yield expectations and liquidity demands of its customers. Competition
was intense between insurance companies and other financial inter-
mediaries like banks, mutual funds, and securities firms. In fact, by
1985 insurance companies managed 11.4 percent of total U.S. financial
assets, whereas in 1960 they managed 20.2 percent--almost.twice the
percentage.
As the barriers between products were reduced and as insurance
companies witnessed financial services companies capturing a signifi-
cant share of their customers’ savings, they took action. To retain the
customer loyalty and franchise enjoyed by insurers, they undertook a
strategy to become full-service companies offering a broad range of
financial products and services. The industry push toward product
diversification began, and the recasting of companies from single-
product "insurance companies" into multi-line full-service "financial
services" companies was pursued with vigor.
During the same period, the explosive growth in tax-exempt pen-
sion funds fueled insurer growth in this direction also. From 1982 to
1988, the size of the U.S. pension market grew from $1.2 trillion in assets
to $2.6 trillion, and the projections are for assets to reach $4.6 trillion or
more by 1995. To capture the lucrative management contracts for these
pension funds, insurers established a variety of separate accounts,
tailored specifically toward managing these assets. Separate accounts
ranged in investment type from bond funds to real~ estate and timber
funds. In addition to separate accounts, in the late 1970s insurers began
to offer guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) designed to provide
secure fixed-income vehicles for purchase by pension plans. Approxi-
mately $30 billion in GICs were sold industrywide in 1990. The level of
total tax-exempt assets (including GICs) managed by the top 25 money
managers has grown steadily and stood at $789 billion in 1989.
With diversification came complexity, which the insurance industry
had also to address and manage. The economic environment, the
insurers’ markets, and the nature of insurers’ book of liabilities had all
changed. With long-standing footings in the disciplines of underwriting
and investment/portfolio management, insurers were well-equipped to
meet their new risk management challenges. In general, insurers were
now holding a book of shorter-term liabilities, and they were forced to
deliver higher yields to customers in order to remain competitive.
Drawing upon their investment skills and experience in financial man-
agement, the majority of life insurance companies adapted well toDISCUSSION 59
increased competition and risk complexity by developing expertise in
asset-liability matching, underwriting, investment, and portfolio man-
agement. The management of assets in any major life insurer today, for
example, entails sophisticated strategies of diversification of assets
among many asset classes, and immunization and interest rate hedging
to assure that the durations of assets and liabilities are accurately
matched. Internal systems to monitor accounts on an ongoing basis are
also employed, making use of advanced computer and investment
research technology.
Track Record Good to Date
Diversification and increased competition brought with it commen-
surate opportunities for both increased success and failure. Margins in
the industry shrank as some competitors underpriced products in order
to gain market share and promised higher yields backed by investments
in riskier assets, including junk bonds. As the markets became more
complex and volatile, the margin for error narrowed. Because many new
financial products were essentially commodities, market share could be
captured simply by underpricing products and crediting overly aggres-
sive interest rates. A number of our brethren in the industry succumbed
to this temptation and are now paying dearly for it, while the majority
of companies rectified their mistakes earlier and reinstilled discipline
and prudence in their investment and product strategies.
Despite the current focus on insurer solvency, the track record of
the insurance industry, though not perfect, speaks for itself. According
to a Conning and Company report issued in May of this year, over the
past three years 55 out of approximately 2,300 insurers domiciled in the
United States have failed, or about 2 percent. By contrast, over one-
fourth of the 3,000 federally insured thrifts are insolvent or in deep
financial trouble, with a projected ultimate cost to the taxpayer of
between $325 billion and $500 billion. Over the past 10 years, assess-
ments of life insurers to bail out insolvent fellow insurers have totaled
about $800 million--paid by the industry itself witl~ a subsidy via a
premium tax credit, not from general tax revenues. These assessments
amounted to 1.25 percent of earnings for the same period. Some of the
questions that have to be raised are how high such assessments could
get in the future, how adequate the current capital reserves of the
solvent insurers are, and why the erosion of asset value experienced by
insurers will not be as serious as that experienced by the banks.60 Thomas E. Moloney
Solvency in the Insurance Industry
The topic of solvency in the insurance industry has been the focus
of many recent studies by various federal and state committees, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), and industry
task forces. The evaluation of solvency in the insurance industry is
difficult because of the broad range in size and product mix of compa-
nies. A true evaluation of solvency must include not only the amount of
capital and surplus, but also asset quality, business mix, company size,
stock versus mutual organizational mix, underwriting exposure, reserve
analysis, reinsurance agreements, management expertise, corporate
strategy, amount of participating versus non-participating business, and
so on. No one measure or handful of ratios can adequately measure
industry solvency.
One trend in insolvencies that has become apparent over the past
five or ten years is the fact that smaller companies seem much more
prone to bankruptcy than larger, better diversified companies. (Well-
publicized exceptions, however, include the failure of Baldwin United in
1983 and the recent failures of Executive Life and First Capital.) A 1990
study by IDS Financial noted that most of the insolvent companies were
regional, licensed to operate in 10 or fewer states, and of an average size
(not including Executive Life and First Capital) of $13 million in admitted
assets. The advantage of the bigger companies lies in the fact that they
are often diversified across many large-scale businesses, such as indi-
vidual life, group health, and group pension, and many also have
several smaller businesses such as annuities, individual disability,
long-term care, brokerage, and other financial and asset management
services. A mistake in any one of these businesses generally will not
bankrupt these companies. This is not true of smaller, less diversified
companies. This does not mean, however, that large, diversified com-
panies cannot make mistakes big enough to cause their bankruptcy.
That is precisely what occurred in the cases of Executive Life and First
Capital. The junk bond holdings of Executive Life and First Capital as of
year-end 1990 amounted to 68 percent and 40 percent of their assets,
respectively, compared to an average of 6.5 percent for the insurance
industry as a whole. Thus, these companies were assuming asset risk of
six to 10 times that of the industry and have paid the price of this
overconcentration in one risky asset class.
There can be no doubt that all insurance companies are feeling to
some degree the strain of the downturn in the national economy and a
decrease in the investment performance of the assets in their portfolios.
Nevertheless, the majority of insurers, even through the aggressive
1970s and 1980s, practiced conservative investment strategies and cur-
rently hold portfolios of relatively high-quality assets. According to a
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even after the NAIC implemented a more stringent classification
method in 1990 for rating bonds, the total value of "high-risk assets"
(bonds the NAIC classified as non-investment-grade, mortgage loans
overdue or in the process of foreclosure, and real estate acquired by
foreclosure), equaled 140 percent of industry capital.1 Since the com-
bined industrywide holdings of bonds, mortgages, and real estate
amounted to over 850 percent of industry capital in 1989, it is clear that
the rate of default and devaluation necessary for an insurer with
typically diversified assets to experience bankruptcy would have to be
unrealistically high. A recent survey of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rated
insurers, for example, indicated that "as a group [insurers] can sustain
losses from high-yield bonds for about 30 years, based on S&P’s current
expectations for bond defaults." (S&P 1991, p. 34) (S&P expects high-
yield securities to have a default rate of 10 to 15 percent in 1991.) I do not
mean to dismiss the potential
should additional large insurers
These problems would be very
failures across the industry is
quality and diversification.
insolvency problems for the industry,
like Executive Life and First Capital fail.
real. But the likelihood of widespread
low, because of relatively high asset
The insurance industry will not experience the same level of
insolvencies as the thrift industry or the commercial banking industry. It
is only logical to attempt to compare the financial condition of the
troubled U.S. banking system and that of another major financial
intermediary, the insurance industry. Kopcke and Randall cogently
describe the implications of overconcentration of risks in one or two
high-risk asset classes and mistakes in underwriting and asset-liability
matching. But fundamental differences in the structure, regulation, and
investment practices of banks and of insurance companies indicate that
they perform differently during cyclical downturns.
Banks manage primarily short-term liabilities, passbook savings
accounts, and so on, whereas insurance companies primarily manage
longer-term liabilities such as life policies (20 or more years), GICs (four
to 10 years), and group annuities (20 or more years). Often penalties and
restrictions apply on the surrender of policies or insurer investment
contracts that do not exist on bank deposits. This feature allows insurers
to invest at fixed rates and not assume significant mismatch risk. In
addition, the very structure of the regional U.S. banking system makes
it very difficult for any but the few largest banks to diversify their
investments geographically and lessen their dependence on the eco-
nomic cycles of a regional economy. The Texas and New England banks
are prime examples of this shortcoming. The majority of insurance
I This calculation was made for a 101-company composite comprising 71 percent of
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companies, by contrast, are national in scope and hold far more
geographically diversified assets in all asset classes, from commercial
and residential mortgage loans to corporate bonds.
Banks not only are less geographically diversified than insurers but
also concentrate their investments in fewer and historically higher-risk
investment classes. For instance, whereas the banks concentrated their
real estate lending in risky construction loans, insurers invested primar-
ily in longer-term commercial mortgages granted on properties that
were income-producing and well leased and generally had a 75 percent
loan-to-value ratio. With this income and value cushion, the property
value must deteriorate significantly before the insurer would suffer a
loss. This difference in the quality of real estate mortgages held by
insurers versus banks is borne out by the relatively low delinquency rate
on insurance company commercial mortgages of 3.6 percent at year-end
1990, as compared to the much higher rate of delinquency experienced
by banks in the troubled regions of the country. In another example,
whereas banks aggressively pursued lending to less developed coun-
tries and highly leveraged transactions, insurers followed more conserv-
ative investment practices and invested only marginally in high-yield
bonds with few or no loans to less developed countries. In addition, the
regulatory reserve requirements of insurers for insurance policy liabili-
ties are very conservative.
One important lesson that insurers have learned from the wide-
spread failures in the banking industry is the false security and even
weakness caused by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation deposit
funds, which removed the discipline and selection mechanisms of the
market and burdened the public and the conservative, stronger banks
with the task of bailing out the most aggressive failed banks. The
consensus among insurers is that it is not healthy to bank on guaranty
funds. In fact, it has been argued that raising FDIC insurance from
$40,000 to $100,000 per account and deregulating the industry too late
contributed to the weakness and trouble in the thrift industry. These are
lessons that the insurance industry has internalized and is integrating
into current discussions on how to address the future regulation of the
insurance industry.
Regulation
The insurance industry has reacted with increased initiatives aimed
at getting our arms around the current problems. The industry invites
thoughtful analysis of its business--such as this forum--and has a long
tradition of self-examination and self-correction. Well before the recent
insolvencies of First Executive and First Capital, the insurance industry
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the help of expert industry analysts and public policymakers. Like
Monday morning quarterbacks, however, a plethora of self-proclaimed
experts have surfaced selling superficial diagnoses and uninformed
prescriptions for the industry. Management in our industry spends
much time and money deflecting the myths sold by these amateurs.
As outlined previously, the insurance industry is a huge and
complex one whose long-term track record of performance is quite good.
In many ways, the system has worked. The majority of companies have
been disciplined in their investment and management practices and
have made adequate reserve provisions. With healthy industrywide
earnings and additions to surplus registered at year-end 1990, and with
the national recession bottoming out, perhaps the worst is behind us. In
any event, short-sighted knee-jerk reactions either by regulators or by
companies themselves must be avoided. Admittedly, we are in the
midst of change and probable entry into what one industry analyst has
called "a new era in life insurance solvency regulation."
Currently five federal-level committees and subcommittees, the
NAIC, the American Council of Life Insurance, and a variety of private
analysts are studying the industry with the primary focus being insurer
solvency. We at John Hancock intend to work with all reputable bodies
trying to shape industry policy for the future. At the same time, we in
the industry are careful to discourage unenlightened proposals for strict
and simplistic regulatory solutions that, in the long run, will serve only
to constrain good management and weaken the industry. Some of the
proposals currently before us include proposed legislation sponsored by
Representative John Dingell of Michigan, supporting a federal oversight
agency funded by user fees; minimum federal solvency standards and
accreditation of state insurance departments; national liquidation of
insolvent insurers rather than the existing state guaranty system;
creation of a federal insurance fraud statute; and preemption of state
regulation of reinsurers and surplus line insurers.
Although not so publicized, the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee
(chaired by Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum) has been active in its
attempts to extend federal antitrust regulation to the insurance industry
through the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Senator believes
that repeal of the Act will make the insurance industry more competitive
and therefore lead to lower prices for consumers. Most insurance
executives believe the repeal of McCarran-Ferguson would be harmful,
because it would prevent insurers from sharing the actuarial data used
to evaluate risk and to properly price products. This would be particu-
larly harmful to smaller insurers, who rely more heavily on the shared
actuarial data to set rates.
The states would generally prefer to remain in control of insurance
regulation. Individually and collectively--through the NAIC~state reg-
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Congress and others. The NAIC has been extremely active on a number
of key issues. Last year the mandatory security valuation reserve
(MSVR) was increased for medium-grade and lower-grade bonds,
thereby increasing the level of reserves available to absorb potential
losses. The NAIC is also considering broadening the MSVR to an "asset
valuation reserve" to include all invested assets. Several companies,
among them John Hancock, already have voluntary reserves for other
asset types, including mortgages and real estate. With regard to insurer
solvency, the NAIC is developing a risk-based capital formula that could
be used to determine the minimum capital and surplus requirement of
each insurer. Again, this would only be institutionalizing a practice
already common among the well-managed companies.
The NAIC would like to enhance its system whereby failure of an
insurer to meet predetermined minimum ratios would trigger certain
actions by state regulators. The NAIC would presumably get tougher on
surplus relief reinsurance transactions and a number of accounting
policies. California is already contemplating administrative action that
would require insurers to remove from their financial statements any
surplus created through reinsurance transactions. The NAIC is also
pushing for the accreditation of state insurance departments. In 1989,
the NAIC laid out guidelines for a set of minimum standards, hoping
each state would use them to evaluate insurers. The NAIC’s scheduled
date for compliance is January of 1994, although to date only four states
have been accredited (New York, Florida, Illinois, and South Carolina).
In taking all these actions, the NAIC hopes to prove to Congress
that it is capable of regulating the insurance industry on its own.
However, a study recently completed by the General Accounting Office
(1991) pointed out several serious limitations:
(1) The NAIC does not have the authority necessary to force state
action or to sustain reforms, since changes in state regulation
must be approved by the state legislators.
(2) Since 1980, the NAIC has put forth a dozen recommended
changes in state legislation; only one, however, has been
adopted by more than one-half of the states.
(3) The General Accounting Office has expressed some skepticism
about the NAIC accreditation process.
Another area of potential legislation concerns the state guaranty
funds. Representative Dingell’s trial balloon, mentioned earlier, pro-
posed a national liquidation fund to replace the current state guaranty
funds. One apparent flaw of the current system is that it allows an
undercapitalized company to compete against stronger companies using
the stronger companies’ protection against losses. The guaranty laws
vary from state to state, but generally the guaranty funds are not
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shortfall between assets and liabilities. This approach allows aggressive
companies that cut margins to gain sales to place the risk on the
conservatively managed companies they compete against.
What will be the result of the efforts of the Congress, the individual
states, and the NAIC? The following appear to be the most likely
outcomes:
(1) The budget deficit makes it difficult but not impossible to form
a new federal bureaucracy to regulate insurance companies. The
issue of federal versus state regulation will play out over the
next few years. The final answer will depend upon a lot of
issues, including how quickly the states can get their act
together, the number and size of insolvencies, and the ability of
the industry to coordinate an effective response.
(2) A risk-based regulatory approach to minimum statutory capital
for insurance companies is highly probable in the next few
years. Banks already operate under a risk-adjusted capital
structure.
(3) Raising the current state minimum capital and surplus stan-
dards for life insurers will not in and of itself solve the capital
problems of the life insurance industry, since even some large
companies may be undercapitalized. If tougher surplus stan-
dards are adopted, it is highly likely that significant consolida-
tion within the industry could result.
(4) Tougher standards could influence investment allocation away
from riskier assets, which need to be supported by more capital;
therefore, investment returns could drop, which would in turn
affect product pricing and profitability.
Ill-conceived legislation would not be in the best interest of the industry.
Therefore, insurers continue to be pro-active with regard to potential
state and federal regulation and--like Kopcke and Randall~favor su-
pervision and monitoring over strict regulation.
Conclusion
Looking to the future, I believe you will see companies returning to
their core strengths and to disciplined financial management. I believe
the industry will consolidate as more highly leveraged companies find it
difficult to retain necessary levels of capital. A flight to quality will occur
among both individual and institutional customers, who have learned
the hard way that prudent, well-balanced investment and management
have no easy substitute. Increased efficiency, differentiation between
the top-rated insurers and all others, and a simultaneous refocusing on66 Tho~nas E. Moloney
rational pricing and profitability will characterize the future. The indus-
try in the past has proven capable of successful self-correction, and the
well-managed companies in the industry are already on their way.
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Frederick S. Townsend, Jr.*
What types of risk do insurance companies bear? Life insurance
executives often think of mortality risk and morbidity risk, with little
consideration of asset risk until recent years. In 1990, the New York
State Insurance Department developed an experimental risk-based cap-
ital formula to determine target surplus levels for life insurance compa-
nies. (The formula has since been turned over to the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners.) The Townsend & Schupp Company
took the experimental New York formula and calculated the individual
and composite results for 130 major life insurance companies, including
the 100 largest companies ranked by asset size, comprising 84 percent of
industry assets. We found that asset risk comprised 50 percent of the
composite’s target surplus, while insurance risk was only 19 percent,
interest rate risk 18 percent, and business risk 13 percent of composite
target surplus.
The Problem
Many companies have reached for riskier assets in recent years,
seeking to attract deposit funds by offering high interest rates. The
primary vehicle used by new and small life insurers was investment in
junk bonds. Large and established life insurers, with mortgage loan and
real estate investment departments, sought to increase long-term yields
by investing in commercial mortgages and real estate projects. The
Townsend & Schupp study found that the holdings by the 130-company
*President, The Townsend & Schupp Company.68 Frederick S. Townsend, Jr,
composite of high-risk assets (the sum of junk bonds, overdue mort-
gages, and real estate acquired by foreclosure) equaled 123 percent of
capital.
While problem mortgages and real estate are creating capital losses
for some companies, overconcentration of junk bond investments
caused the initial surge of conservatorship actions in early 1991. Execu-
tive Life of California, Executive Life of New York, First Capital Life, and
Fidelity Bankers Life held 83 percent, 68 percent, 46 percent and 40
percent of their respective bond portfolios in non-investment-grade
bonds as of December 31, 1990.
Overconcentration in a risky asset class was the first problem. The
second problem was the poor credit quality of many of these bonds,
which led to market values well below their stated asset values (amor-
tized cost). Finally, the companies have no protection against a "run on
the bank." These junk bond investors suffered asset write-downs, then
were exposed to both truth and rumors, and then experienced runs on
the bank, especially on single-premium deferred annuity (SPDA) prod-
ucts. This caused negative cash flow. This, in turn, caused the realiza-
tion of further capital losses at depressed market prices.
Possible Remedies
In their paper, Richard Kopcke and Richard Randall point out that
one remedy is more capital in the industry. Many stock life insurers
have strong parent companies that can provide new capital. Kemper
Investors Life, Northwestern National Life, and United Pacific Life have
34 to 35 percent of their bond portfolios in non-investment-grade bond
issues, but all three companies have financially strong parent compa-
nies. In fact, this year Kemper Investors has received two capital
infusions to reduce the heat and publicity surrounding its investment in
junk bonds. Northwestern National Life’s parent company is selling a
new issue of preferred stock to raise capital for its life subsidiary.
A second remedy, which Kopcke and Randall downplay slightly, is
to enact limits against concentrated investments in risky asset classes. If
the companies in conservatorship that I mentioned earlier had limited
their investment in junk bonds to 20 percent of their bond portfolios,
would they be in the news today? I think not. Such limits might have
saved them, had they been in effect five to ten years ago.
A third remedy might be to attempt to prevent runs on the bank on
non-life products, such as the competitive single-premium deferred
annuity (SPDA), by using smart product design. Limited early surren-
der options, large surrender charges, and market value adjustments
may inhibit a run on the bank, but would these product features attractDISCUSSION 69
any buyers? The market share will just drift to other, riskier carriers that
do not enact these features.
Threats to Solvency
The problem of the run on the bank emphasizes the fact that many
life insurers manage an unmatched book. While they expect to receive a
sufficiently large margin to compensate for this risk, the margin has
proved to be insufficient for many companies.
Basic life insurance products and annuity options offer death
benefits and other services not matched by securities and mutual funds,
as pointed out by Kopcke and Randall. Life insurers can earn sufficient
margins on life insurance products, but often expose themselves to risk
when they offer a competitive savings product such as the single-
premium deferred annuity, which has no death benefits and therefore
no distinction from investment products.
High capital ratios can increase the odds of survival, but it must be
noted that Executive Life of California had an 8.5 percent capital ratio in
1988 and was already locked in to its ultimate fate before the problem
was realized. Executive Life’s management attempted to raise capital
every year during the company’s growth phase, perhaps recognizing
the high risk inherent in the company’s investment strategy, and until
the last year they were successful.
So high capital ratios may even encourage higher levels of risk-
taking. Conversely, some life insurers maintain low capital ratios to
increase returns on equity, but they do not necessarily have to adopt
risky investment strategies. For instance, major life insurers often direct
annuity sales to subsidiaries with modest capital, which creates low
capital ratios. Provident National, American International Life, Variable
Annuity Life, and Transamerica Life all have capital ratios under 4
percent, but that is management policy. Management wants to isolate a
given line of business and manage it for an efficient return. In the
absence of a strong parent company, however, high asset leverage does
increase the odds that failing insurers will not recover. First Capital Life
and Fidelity Bankers Life, two companies the authors mention, main-
tained capital ratios under 5 percent with a risky asset mix for a number
of years.
Kopcke and Randall’s discussion of guaranty funds fails to state that
life insurance reserves, unlike property-liability reserves, are deter-
mined by precise actuarial formulas, and that reserves must equal or
exceed the cash values on each and every policy. Thus, if a life insurer’s
statutory surplus has fallen to zero, and if assets are fairly valued,
several major companies will always be willing to assume the failing
company’s business.70 Frederick S. Townsend, Jr.
It is interesting to note that life insurers hold 32 percent of total
corporate bonds and 27 percent of commercial mortgages. The
.Townsend & Schupp 130-company composite shows that at last year’s
end, bonds were 56.8 percent and mortgage loans 24.5 percent of 1990
invested assets, with the weighted maturity of the bond portfolio at 11.5
years. Weighted bond maturities exceeding 10 years may be safe for life
insurance products with death benefits and for annuitized products,
because the buyer has a reason and the desire to keep such products in
force with the issuing companies. Guaranteed investment contracts
(GICs) and single-premium deferred annuities (SPDAs) should have
shorter maturities, in order to match their liability durations and to
protect the life insurers against unstable interest rate environments.
The "Deadly Trio"--the combination of high asset leverage, long
bond maturities, and below-average investment yield--can kill a life
insurance company when interest rates rise sharply. The company’s
inability to compete will force the sale of depressed assets when the
capital ratio is too low. On the other hand, new companies, unburdened
by low yields, did acquire substantial assets by promoting products as
investment contracts, which buyers in turn viewed as financial invest-
ments.
The authors point out that 75 percent of their sample’s assets are
held by companies with a capital ratio under 6 percent. The Townsend
& Schupp 130-company composite at the end of 1990 had a capital ratio
of 6.1 percent including separate account assets, but the ratio is 7.5
percent when measured against general account assets less policy loans,
whose risks are borne by the policyholders, not by the company.
(Separate account asset risks are generally borne by the contract holders,
although some exceptions are now arising.) Those 130 companies
comprise 84 percent of industry assets. The United States as a whole has
2,400 life insurance companies and for the entire group the capital ratio
is 10 percent. Many of the smaller companies have much higher capital
ratios than the big boys in the industry.
Another point generally overlooked is that the capital ratio is driven
downward in the life industry by regulation. Capital ratios are limited to
10 percent for mutual life insurers writing business in New York State,
a major segment of the life industry assets in the United States. So a
mutual company operating in New York that has excess accumulation of
surplus must distribute it.
The value of real estate, stocks, junk bonds, and commercial
mortgage loans depends on business risks, as the authors point out.
And as has been demonstrated in recent months, this is the source of
news stories that shake consumer confidence. When cash flow problems
occur, some companies have financed cash flow with guaranteed
investment contracts written with modest or negative spreads. The gain
or loss on a GIC contract is usually determined when it is issued.DISCUSSION 71
Companies should match the durations on GIC contracts. Fewer than 20
percent of GIC contracts renew with the same company.
The public does view companies with large surplus positions as
offering safety, but some large companies have high risk levels. This is
certainly true of Equitable Life Assurance, which has an asset profile and
an underwriting record unlike any other of the 20.largest life insurers.
To date, it has been rapid growth and concentration in junk bonds
that have put companies into conservatorship. Concentration in com-
mercial real estate has been limited to the larger, more established life
insurers, and has only caused large dents in their surplus.
The characteristics of potential failures in the life insurance industry
include high ratios of risky assets to capital, significant differences
between market values and stated asset values, capital losses, low
capital ratios, the inability to raise capital, low net cash flow from
operations, and high levels of cash surrender activity. Capital declines
when capital losses exceed earnings, or when earnings are paid out in
shareholder dividends to finance parent company commitments.
The basic risks to survival are operating leverage leading to oper-
ating losses, asset leverage leading to capital losses, low-quality assets
with depressed market values, interest rate risk exposure to a decline in
asset values, leveraged buyouts that force payout of operating earnings,
low cash flow that causes untimely sale of depressed assets, and the
dreaded run on the bank. Once a run starts, an otherwise sound
company may have to be placed in conservatorship to prevent asset-
liability mismatches from occurring.
If, ten years ago, all states had limited junk bond investments to 20
percent of invested assets, would the life insurance industry be in such
turmoil today? Would any major companies have gone into conserva-
torship? As the authors point out, capital ratios decline in the problem-
realization phase, not in the risk-taking phase. Perhaps an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure.
The Case Studies
The authors refer to eleven case studies, but present only four case
studies in Appendix 2.1 As a securities analyst in insurance stocks, I am
critical of the four case studies on two counts: (1) the authors mesh
parent holding company problems with the subsidiary life company
problems, and (2) I disagree with the authors on critical issues.
Executive Life suffered from buying junk bonds that were issued
1 An additional case has now been added with the takeover of Mutual Benefit Life.
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not to support corporate operations but to finance leveraged buyouts.
This made the bonds risky when purchased. Many of these bonds were
bought through Drexel Burnham. A study of default rates on Drexel
bonds, published in Barron’s, revealed significantly higher rates than
historical default rate studies.
In both the First Capital Life and the Fidelity Bankers Life cases,
capital losses have not yet been "sufficient to easily wipe out capital and
cause major losses to policyholders." On March 31, 1991, the two
companies reported $151 million and $141 million of capital, respec-
tively. The companies are in conservatorship to stop runs on the bank,
and regulators have not yet forecast any losses to policyholders.
Baldwin-United subsidiaries issued SPDA contracts that guaranteed
long-term returns of up to 14 percent per annum. Part of the company’s
downfall was investing policyholder assets in securities of affiliated
companies, which provided no investment return to the life companies.
This led to operating losses and ultimately to negative cash flow.
Monarch Life Insurance Company did not have bank debt and real
estate problems. Its parent company did. The parent company invested
in real estate and incurred debt independent of Monarch Life. Monarch
suffered from sales success. This company had only $117 million of
capital in 1984, but wrote $3.5 billion of direct premiums in the next
three years. The cost of writing new business caused Monarch Life to
raise capital through reinsurance and through sales of assets.